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INTRODUCTION
Thomas Jefferson once described the religion clauses of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution as a "fair" and "novel experi-
ment" in religious rights and liberties.' The religion clauses, declared Jef-
ferson, defied the millennium-old assumptions inherited from Western
Europe-that one form of Christianity must be established in a commu-
nity, and that the state must protect and support it against other religions.
The religion clauses, Jefferson argued, suffer neither prescriptions nor pro-
scriptions of religion. All forms of Christianity must stand on their own
feet and on an equal footing with all other religions. Their survival and
growth must turn on the cogency of their word, not the coercion of the
sword, on the faith of their members, not the force of the law.
2
This bold constitutional experiment in religious liberty, though
neither as fair nor as novel as Jefferson believed,3 remains intact and in
progress in the United States. The First Amendment religion clauses,
drafted in 1789 and ratified in 1791, 4 remain the predominant federal con-
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Six Baptist Associations Represented at Chesterfield, Va.
(Nov. 21, 1808), in THE COMPLETEJEFFERSON, CONTAINING His MAJOR WRITINGS 538 (Saul K. Pa-
dover ed., 1943); see SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN
AMERICA (1963).
2 See, e.g., Letter ofJanuary 23, 1808, in 11 THE WORKS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 7 (Paul L. Ford
ed., 1904) (arguing against state involvement in religion); Autobiography, in 1 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904); see also Thomas Jefferson, Notes for a Speech in
the Virginia House of Delegates, in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 537-39 (Julian P. Boyd
ed., 1950) (arguing that the 1785 Virginia statute establishing religious freedom "meant to com-
prehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and the
Mahometan, the Hindoo, and Infidel of every denomination").
3 For examples of prototypes, see the religious liberty clauses cast in the aftermath of the
Dutch Reformation in the 1570s and 1580s, collected in TEXTS CONCERNING THE REVOLT OF THE
NETHERLANDS (E.H. Kossmann & A.F. Mellink trans. & eds., 1974) with discussion in OJ. Dejong,
Union and Religion, in THE Low COUNTRIES HISTORYYEARBOOK 29 (1981) and GERHARD GfJLDNER,
DAS TOLERANZ-PROBLEM IN DEN NIEDERLANDEN IM AUSGANG DES 16.JAHRHUNDERTS [THE PROBLEM
OF TOLERATION IN THE NETHERLANDS AT THE END OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY] (1968). For other
European prototypes, see Karl Schwarz, Der Begriff Exercitium Religionis Privatum, [The Concept of
Private Religious Exercise], 105 ZEITSGHRIFr DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG (KAN. AB.) 495 (1988); Brian
Tierney, Religious Rights: A Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPEC-
TIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECrVES 17-46 (John Witte,Jr. &Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996) [herein-
after Witte & van der Vyver eds., RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGIOUS PERsPECrvES]. James
Madison, an equally important architect of the American experiment, was aware of these Dutch
prototypes. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Rev. [jasper] Adams (1832), in 9 THE Wirr-
INGS OFJAMES MADISON 484-88 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) ("Until Holland ventured on the experi-
ment of combining a liberal toleration with the establishment of a particular creed, it was taken
for granted that an exclusive & intolerant establishment was essential.... It remained for North
America to bring the great & interesting subject to a fair, and finally to a decisive test.").
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...").
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stitutinal text to govern religious rights and liberties in America.5 Princi-
pal governance of this experiment-initially left to state legislatures and
state courts-has since the 1940s fallen largely to the United States
Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
The American experiment in religious liberty initially inspired exuber-
ant rhetoric throughout the young republic and beyond. Elhanan
Winchester, a Baptist preacher turned Universalist, declared proudly to a
London audience in 1789:
There is but one country in the world where liberty, and especially reli-
gious liberty, is so much enjoyed as in these kingdoms, and that is the
United States of America: there religious liberty is in the highest perfec-
don. All stand there on equal ground. There are no religious establish-
ments, no preference of one denomination of Christians above another.
The constitution knows no difference between one good man, and an-
other. A man may be chosen there to the highest civil offices, without
being obliged to give any account of his faith, subscribe [to] any religious
test, or go to the communion table of any church. 6
Yale President Ezra Stiles predicted robustly in 1793:
The United States will embosom all the religious sects or denominations
in christendom. Here they may all enjoy their whole respective systems of
worship and church government, complete .... All religious denomina-
tions will be independent of one another.., and having, on account of
religion, no superiority as to secular powers and civil immunities, they will
cohabit together in harmony, and I hope, with a most generous catholi-
cism and benevolence.
7
Dozens of such confident endorsements of the American experiment in
religious rights and liberties can be found in the sermons, pamphlets, and
monographs of the young American republic.8
Today, the American experiment inspires far more criticism than
praise. The United States does "embosom" all religious sects and denomi-
nations, as President Stiles predicted, not only from Christendom, but from
around the world. American citizens do enjoy remarkable freedom of
thought, conscience, and belief-too much freedom, according to some
commentators.9 But the laboratory of the United States Supreme Court,
which has directed the American experiment for the past fifty years, no
5 The only other explicit constitutional provision, the prohibition against religious test
oaths, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cI. 2, has been subject to only modest judicial interpretation. See
Gerald V. Bradley, The No Rel'gious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine
That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. Rv. 674 (1987); Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of
Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 83.
6 Elhanan Winchester, A Century Sermon on the Glorious Revolution, in PoLncAL SERMONS OF
THE AmRICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, at 969, 988-99 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991) [hereinafter
PoLrTCAL SERMONS].
7 EzRA STiLs, THE UNrrED STATES ELEvATED TO GLORY AND HONOR 55 (1793) (with modern-
ized spelling and italics in original removed).
8 See infra notes 83-85, 159-66 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., LEONARD W. Lv,, BLASPHEMY. VERBAL OFFENSE AGANsr THE SACRED FROM MOSES
TO SALMAN RuSHDIE 568 (1993) ("We have become not only a free society, but also a numb
society. We are beyond outrage."); Harold J. Berman, Some Reflections on the Differences Between
Soviet and American Concepts of Relations Between Church and State, 5 (2) CHRISTIAN LEGAL Soc'y Q. 12
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longer inspires confidence. Not only have the Court's recent decisions on
the fights of religious minorities in America-particularly Jews, 10 native
American Indians," and Muslims' 2 -evoked withering attacks in the popu-
lar and professional media. The Court's entire record on religious liberty
has become vilified for its lack of consistent and coherent principles and its
uncritical use of mechanical tests and empty metaphors.' 3 "Religion
Clause jurisprudence," writes Mary Ann Glendon,
has been described on all sides, and even by Justices themselves, as un-
principled, incoherent, and unworkable.... [T] he Court must now grap-
ple seriously with the formidable interpretive problems that were
overlooked or given short shrift in the past. The task is an urgent one,
for it concerns nothing less than the cultural foundations of our experi-
ment in ordered liberty.
14
The United States Supreme Court is not the only body that is now
"grappling" with the experiment. In the past few years, the testing ground
seems to be shifting away from the courts to the legislatures, and away from
the federal government to the states-a trend encouraged by several recent
Supreme Court opinions.' 5 Congress has issued a number of acts to de-
fend the free exercise rights of various religious individuals and groups,
and in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to define the appropriate
free exercise test to be used in future cases.16 At the same time, state legis-
latures and courts have become bolder in conducting their own experi-
ments in religious liberty that seem calculated to revisit, if not rechallenge,
(1984) ("Today it is by no means clear that the experiment [proposed by Jefferson] has
succeeded.").
10 See, e.g., Board of Educ. of KiryasJoel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994)
(state's creation of a single public school district within an exclusively Satmar Hasidic community
violates establishment clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (ecumenical prayer by a
Jewish rabbi at public middle school graduation ceremony violates establishment clause);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting free exercise claim of a military officer to
wear his yarmulke on duty).
11 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (de-
nial of unemployment compensation to native American discharged for use of sacramental pe-
yote, a proscribed narcotic, does not violate free exercise clause); Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (construction of road through section of national
forest regarded as sacred ground by three tribes does not violate free exercise clause); Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (administration's use of social security number does not violate free
exercise rights of native American, who believes such use would impair his child's spirit).
12 See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabbaz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (denying special free exercise
accommodation for Muslim prisoner to engage in collective Friday worship).
13 See generally Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115
(1992); John Witte, Jr., The Integration of Religious Liberty, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 1363 (1992).
14 Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MicH. L. REv. 477, 478
(1991); see also Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom Language of the
Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 672 (1992).
15 See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 230, 237-50
(1993) (arguing that the Court has "retreated" on establishment clause cases since 1980 by its
growing judicial deference to legislatures); Stuart D. Poppel, Federalism, Fundamental Fairness, and
the Religion Clauses, 25 CUMB. L. REv. 247, 272-85 (1995) (suggesting that the principle of federal-
ism, adduced in recent cases, demands greater room for such "experimentation" by the states).
16 See, e.g., American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) (amended
1994); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (West 1994); Military Ap-
parel Act, 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994); Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071-74 (1994); see also discussion
infra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71:3
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF RELIGION
prevailing Supreme Court interpretations of the establishment and free ex-
ercise clauses.' 7 These recent trends have served to exacerbate the indeter-
minacy of the American experiment.
When an experiment becomes a "kind of wandering inquiry, without
any regular system of operations," wrote Francis Bacon, the "father" of the
experimental method, "prudence commends three correctives."' 8 First,
said Bacon, we must "return to first principles and axioms," reassess them
in light of our experience, and "if necessary refine them." Second, we must
assess "our experience with the experiment" in light of these first princi-
ples, to determine where "the experiment should be adjusted." Third, we
must "compare our experiments" and experiences with those of fellow
scientists, and where we see in that comparison "superior techniques," we
must "amend our experiments" and even our first principles accordingly. 19
Though Bacon offered these prudential instructions principally to correct
scientific experiments that had gone awry, his instructions commend them-
selves to legal and political experiments as well-as he himself sought to
demonstrate in seventeenth century English law and politics.
2 0
This Article applies Bacon's prudential instructions to the American
constitutional experiment in religious rights and liberties-an experiment
that today is, indeed, "wandering, without any regular system of opera-
tons." Applying Bacon's first instruction, Part I distills from the diverse
theological and political traditions and experiences of the eighteenth cen-
tury the most widely embraced "first principles" of the American constitu-
tional experiment-the "essential rights and liberties of religion," to use
eighteenth century parlance.2' These principles included liberty of con-
science, free exercise of religion, confessional and structural pluralism, equality of
religions before the law, separation of the institutions of church and state, and dises-
tablishment of religion. Applying Bacon's second instruction, Part II analyzes
the American constitutional experience in light of these first principles,
lifting these principles out of the familiar free exercise and establishment
clause cases of the past half century. Applying Bacon's third instruction,
Part Il considers the principles and practices of the American experiment
against prevailing international norms of religious rights and liberties, find-
17 See genera/y Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutiona Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerg-
ingPost-SmithJurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 275; Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought?
An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 V~u.. L. REv. 1 (1994).
18 FRANCis BACON, The Great Instauration, in THE NEW ORGANON AND RELATED WRITINGS 7-16
(Fulton H. Anderson ed., 1960).
19 FRANcis BACON, Aphorisms Book One, in THE NEW ORGANON AND RELATED WRITINGS, supra
note 18, §§ 70, 82, 103, 104, at 67-69, 78-80, 97-98.
20 See generally Barbara Shapiro, Sir Francis Bacon and the Mid-Seventeenth Centuiy Movement for
Law Reform, 24 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 331 (1980).
21 The phrase comes from a 1744 tract of Elisha Williams, a Puritan jurist and theologian,
who served as rector of Yale University, military chaplain, judge of the Connecticut Supreme
Court, and representative to the Connecticut General Assembly. See ELisHA Wmuimis, THE Es-
SENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS: A SEAsoNABLE PLEA FOR THE LIBERTY OF CON-
SCIENCE, AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVATEJUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF RELIGION, WITHOUT ANY CONTROUL
FROM HUMAN AUTHORry (1744) [hereinafter ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES]. James Madison
also spoke of "essential rights" and liberties of religion in the First Session of Congress. See, e.g., 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 784 (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834); see also infra notes 87-89 and accompany-
ing text.
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ing much of the American experiment confirmed, but also finding por-
tions of it need of refinement.
This Article is more expansionist than revisionist in inspiration and
methodology. The essential rights and liberties of religion analyzed and
advocated herein are not new creations. But I ground these principles in
several eighteenth century sources and twentieth century international pro-
totypes that have not been part of the conventional discussion. I also strip
them of the thick accretions of recent casuistry that have obscured their
essential value, vigor, and validity. The call for an integrated framework of
religious liberty in America is also not new. But I warn against efforts to
reduce the religion clause guarantees to one or two principles alone-even
the vaunted principles in vogue today, such as neutrality, separation, equal-
ity, or accommodation. Religion is simply too vital and valuable a source of
individual flourishing and social cohesion to be left to such primitive legal
defenses. As both eighteenth century American writers and twentieth cen-
tury international jurists have repeatedly argued, a variety of principles
must be integrated into an interlocking and interdependent shield of reli-
gious liberties and rights for all. The principles of liberty of conscience,
free exercise, pluralism, equality, separation, and disestablishment form
the essential amalgam of any such shield.
I. THE "GENESIS" OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT
The religion clauses of the state constitutions and of the First Amend-
ment, forged between 1776 and 1791, express both theological and polit-
ical sentiments. They reflect both the convictions of the religious believers
of the young American republic and the calculations of their political lead-
ers. They manifest both the certitude of leading eighteenth century theo-
logians such as Isaac Backus and John Witherspoon, and the skepticism of
such contemporaneous philosophers as Thomas Jefferson and Thomas
Paine. A plurality of theological and political views helped to inform the
early American constitutional experiment in religious rights and liberties,
and to form the so-called original intent of the constitutional framers.
The American experiment in religious rights and liberties cannot, in
my view, be reduced to the First Amendment religion clauses alone, nor
can the intent of the framers be determined simply by studying the cryptic
record of the debates on these clauses in the First Session of Congress-
however valuable that source is still today.22 Not only are these Congres-
sional records incomplete, but the First Amendment religion clauses, by
design, reflect only a small part of the early constitutional experiment and
experience. The religion clauses, on their face, define only the outer
22 For analysis of these debates in context, see infra notes 78-166 and accompanying text. For
various interpretations, see, e.g., MICHAELJ. MALBIN, RELIGION AND PoIrTics: THE INTENTIONS OF
THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and History of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1473 (1990); Douglas Laycock, "Non-Preferential"
Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent 27 WM. & MARY L Rxv. 875 (1986); Rodney L
Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing
of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20
WAKE FOREST L REv. 569 (1984); Walter Berns, Religion and the Founding Principle, in THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 204 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 3d ed. 1986).
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boundaries of appropriate government action respecting religion-govern-
ment may not prescribe ("establish") religion nor proscribe ("prohibit") its
exercise. Precisely what governmental conduct short of outright prescrip-
tion or proscription of religion is constitutionally permissible is left open
for debate and development. Moreover, the religion clauses on their face
bind only the federal government ("Congress"), rendering prevailing state
constitutional provisions, and the sentiments of their drafters, equally vital
sources of original intent. Finally, the drafters of the religion clauses urged
interpreters to look not to the drafters' intentions, but, in James Madison's
words, "to the text itself [and] the sense attached to it by the people in
their respective State Conventions, where it received all the authority which
it possesses."23 The understanding of the state conventional delegates was
derived from their own state constitutional experiments and experiences,
which are reflected in contemporaneous pamphlets, sermons, letters, and
speeches. A wide range of eighteenth century materials must thus be con-
sulted to come to terms with the prevailing sentiments on religious rights
and liberties in the young American republic.
A. Four Views of Religious Rights and Liberties in the Late Eighteenth Century
Within the eighteenth century sources at hand, two pairs of theologi-
cal perspectives on religious liberties and rights were critical to constitu-
tional formation: those of congregational Puritans and of free church
evangelicals. Two pairs of contemporaneous political perspectives were
equally influential: those of enlightenment thinkers and civic republicans.
24
Exponents of these four perspectives often found common cause and used
common language, particularly during the Constitutional Convention and
ratification debates. Yet each group cast its views in a distinctive ensemble,
with its own emphases and its own applications.
It must be emphasized that this is a heuristic classification, not a
wooden taxonomy, of the multiple opinions on religious rights and liber-
ties in the early republic. Other views besides these circulated, and other
labels besides these were (and can be) used to describe these four views.
2 5
23 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Richie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 3 LEa-Ras AND OTHER
WRITINGs OFJAmEs MADISON 228 (1821). For similar sentiments, see Letter from James Madison
to Major Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 3 LETas AND OTHER WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 442
(1821); 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1834) (where Madison writes: "As the instrument came from
[the drafter] it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and
validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through their several State
conventions."). See generally B.N. Ong, James Madison on Constitutional Interpretation, 3 BENCHMARK
18 (1987); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent 98 HARv. L. Rnv. 885
(1985).
24 For other classifications of the framers' perspectives, see, e.g., ARLN M. ADAMS & CHARLES
J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDCAT TO RFLIGIOUS LIBERTY 21-31 (1990) (distinguishing enlighten-
ment separationists, political centrists, and pietistic separationists); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE
MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 52-86
(1993) (contrasting enlightenment, civic republican, Protestant, and common law traditions of
constitutionalism); McConnell, supra note 22, at 1430-55 (contrasting Lockeian-Jeffersonian, vari-
ous evangelical, and Madisonian views).
25 For a taxonomy of ideological and theological schools of thought, see, e.g., William W.
Fisher II, Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private Property: 1760-1860, 39 EMORY
LJ. 65, 71-82 (1990).
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Moreover, individual writers of the eighteenth century often straddled two
or more perspectives, shifted their allegiances or alliances over time, or
changed their tones as they moved from formal writing to the pulpit or to
the political platform. John Adams, for example, expounded both Puritan
and civic republican views.2 6 John Witherspoon moved freely between ev-
angelical and civic republican camps.2 7 Jonathan Edwards, at least in his
political and ethical writings, toed (and moved) the line between old light
Puritan and new light evangelical perspectives.28 James Madison's early
writings on religious liberty had a strong evangelical flavor; his political
speeches in the early sessions of Congress often pulsed with civic republi-
can sentiments; his later writings, particularly after his Presidency, were of
increasingly firm enlightenment stock.
2 9
Nonetheless, exponents of these four views offered distinctive and dis-
tinguishable teachings on religious rights and liberties, and collectively had
the most influence on constitutional formation. The so-called original in-
tent of the American constitutional framers respecting government and
religion cannot be reduced to any one of these views. It must be sought in
the tensions among them and in the general principles that emerge from
their interaction.30 What follows is (1) a summary of each of these four
views; and (2) a distillation of the general principles of religious rights and
liberties that these four groups and others propagated.
1. Puritan Views
The New England Puritans were the direct heirs of the theology of
religious liberty taught by European Calvinists.31 They had revised and re-
fined this European legacy through the efforts of John Winthrop, John
Cotton, Cotton Mather, Jonathan Edwards, Charles Chauncy, Jonathan
Mayhew, and a host of other eminent writers. Since the 1630s, the Puritans
had dominated the New England colonies and thus had ample occasion to
cast their theological and political principles into constitutional practice.32
The Puritans who wrote on religious liberties and rights were con-
cerned principally with the nature of the church, of the state, and of the
relationship between them.33 They conceived of the church and the state
26 See generallyJOHN R. HOWE,JR., THE CHANGING POLITICAL THOUGHT OFJOHN ADAMS (1966).
27 See generally MARTHA Lou LEMMON STOHLMAN, JOHN WITHERSPOON: PARSON, PoLITICIAN,
PATRIOT (1976); JOHN WITHERSPOON, THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON (Thomas
Miller ed., 1990).
28 See the notes and samples in JONATHAN EDWARDS, ETHICAL WRITINGS (Paul Ramsey ed.,
1989).
29 See WILLIAM L. MILLER, THE FIRST IABERTY. RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPuBUc (1986).
30 See ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 24, at 21-22, 31.
31 SeeJohn Witte, Jr., Moderate Religious Liberty in the Theoloo ofJohn Calvin, in RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT (Noel B. Reynolds & W. Cole Durham, Jr. eds., forthcoming 1996).
32 Portions of the following section are drawn from John Witte, Jr., B est Be the Ties that Bind:
Covenant and Community in Puritan Thought, 36 EMORY Lj. 579-601 (1987);John Witte, Jr., How to
Govern a City on a Hill The Early Puritan Contribution to American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY LJ.
41-64 (1990). For samples of Puritan writings, see THE PURITANS (Perry Miller & Thomas H.
Johnson eds., 1938) and PURITAN PoLrIcA IDEAS, 1558-1794 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1965).
33 The Puritan contribution to the American tradition of religious liberty, though generally
ignored by current commentators, was well understood in the eighteenth century. See, e.g.,JOHN
ADAMS, DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND THE FEUDAL LAw (1765), reprinted in 1 PAPERS OFJOHN
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as two separate covenantal associations, two seats- of Godly authority in the
community. Each institution, they believed, was vested with a distinct polity
and calling. The church was to be governed by pastoral, pedagogical, and
diaconal authorities who were called to preach the word, administer the
sacraments, teach the young, care for the poor and the needy. The state
was to be governed by executive, legislative, and judicial authorities who
were called to enforce law, punish crime, cultivate virtue, and protect
peace and order.
In the New England communities where their views prevailed, the Pu-
ritans adopted a variety of safeguards to ensure the basic separation of the
institutions of church and state. Church officials were prohibited from
holding political office, serving on juries, interfering in governmental af-
fairs, endorsing political candidates, or censuring the official conduct of a
statesman. Political officials, in turn, were prohibited from holding minis-
terial office, interfering in internal ecclesiastical government, performing
sacerdotal functions of clergy, or censuring the official conduct of a
cleric.34 To permit any such officiousness on the part of church or state
officials, GovernorJohn Winthrop averred, "would confound[ ] those Juris-
dictions, which Christ hath made distinct."
35
Although church and state were not to be confounded, however, they
were still to be "close and compact."3 6 For, to the Puritans, these two insti-
tutions were inextricably linked in nature and in function. Each was an
instrument of Godly authority. Each did its part to establish and maintain
the community. As one mid-eighteenth century writer put it, "I look upon
this as a little model of the Gloriou[s] Kingdome of Christ on earth. Christ
Reigns among us in the Common wealth as well as in the Church, and hath
his glorious Interest involved and wrapt up in the good of both Societies
respectively."3 7 The Puritans, therefore, readily countenanced the coordi-
nation and cooperation of church and state.
State officials provided various forms of material aid to churches and
their officials. Public properties were donated to church groups for meet-
ing houses, parsonages, day schools, and orphanages. Tax collectors col-
lected tithes and special assessments to support the ministers and ministry
of the congregational church. Tax exemptions and immunities were ac-
corded to some of the religious, educational, and charitable organizations
that they operated. Special subsidies and military protections were pro-
ADAMs 115-16 (R. Taylor et al. eds., 1977) (describing the Puritans as "apostles of religious lib-
erty" who were the first in America "to establish a government of the church more consistent with
the scriptures, and a government of the state more agreable to the dignity of humane nature");
JOSEPH PRIESThY, AN ADDRESS TO PROTESTANT DISSENTERS OF ALL DENOMINATIONS 5-6 (1774) (argu-
ing that "[ r] eligious liberty.., cannot be maintained except on the basis of civil liberty" and that
"the Puritans and Nonconformists were equally distinguished for their noble and strenuous exer-
tions in favour of them both").
34 See, e.g., THE LAws AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 18-20 (Max Farrand ed., Harvard
Univ. Press, photo. reprint 1929) (Cambridge 1648); The Cambridge Platform, 1648, in THE CREEDS
AND PLATrORMS OF CONGREGATIONALISM 194, 234-37 (Williston Walker ed., 1960).
35 Quoted in T.H. BREEN, THE CHARACrER OF THE GOOD RULER, 1630-1730, at 42 n.24 (1970).
36 Letter from John Cotton to Lord Say and Seal (1636), in THE PuRITANS, supra note 32, at
209.
37 UAN OAxES, NEw-ENGLAND PLEADED WITH, AND PRESSED TO CONSIDER THE THINGS WHICH
CONCERN HER PEACE 49 (1673).
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vided for missionaries and religious outposts. Special criminal laws prohib-
ited interference with religious properties and services. State officials also
provided various forms of moral support to the church. Sabbath day laws
prohibited all forms of unnecessary labor and uncouth leisure on Sundays
and holy days, and required faithful attendance at worship services.
Church officials, in turn, provided various forms of material aid and
accommodation to the state. Church meetinghouses and chapels were
used not only to conduct religious services, but also to host town assem-
blies, political rallies, and public auctions, to hold educational and voca-
tional classes, to house the community library, to maintain census rolls and
birth, marriage, and death certificates. Parsonages were used not only to
house the minister and his family, but also to harbor orphans and windows,
the sick and the aged, victims of abuse and disaster. Church officials also
afforded various forms of moral support to the state. They preached obedi-
ence to the authorities and imposed spiritual discipline on parishioners
found guilty of crime.38 They encouraged their parishioners to be active in
political affairs and each year offered "election day sermons" on Christian
political principles.39 They offered learned expositions on the require-
ments of Godly law, and occasionally offered advice to legislatures and
courts.
Puritan leaders of colonial New England left little room for individual
religious experimentation. Despite their adherence to a basic separation
of the institutions of church and state, the New England authorities in-
sisted on general adherence to the creeds and canons of Puritan Calvinism.
Already in the 1630s, dissidents from this faith, such as Anne Hutchinson
and Roger Williams, were summarily dismissed from the colony.40 Immi-
gration restrictions in Massachusetts Bay throughout the seventeenth cen-
tury left little room to Quakers, Catholics, Jews, "Familists, Antinomians,
and other Enthusiasts."4' Although in the eighteenth century, religious
dissidents of many kinds came to be tolerated in the New England colonies,
they enjoyed only limited political rights and social opportunities and were
subject to a variety of special governmental restrictions, taxes, and other
encumbrances. 42
38 See generally EMIL OBERHOLZER, DELINQUENT SAINTS: DiSCIPLINARY ACTIONS IN THE EARLY
CONGREGATIONAL CHURCHES OF MASSACHUSETTS (1956); Ronald A. Bosco, Lectures at the Pillory:
The Early American Execution Sermon, 30 AM. Q. 156 (1978) (describing the practice of New Eng-
land preachers of offering lectures on the importance of moral and legal principles on the occa-
sion of public executions).
39 See generally HARRY S. STOUT, THE NEW ENGLAND SOUL: PREACHING AND RELIGIOUS CULTURE
IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND (1986); DONALD WEBER, RHETORIC AND HISTORY IN REVOLUTIONARY
NEW ENGLAND (1988). See further the collection of sermons in THE PULPIT OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (John W. Thornton ed., 1860), updated and expanded in POLITICAL SERMONS, supra
note 6.
40 See generally THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638 (David D. Hall ed., 1968); EDMUND
S. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE (1967).
41 NATHANIEL WARD, THE SIMPLE COBLER OF AGGAWAM IN AMERICA 43 (5th ed. 1713).
42 See generally WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT 1630-1833 (1971).
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2. Evangelical Views
Though the evangelical tradition of religious liberty is sometimes
traced to the seventeenth century-particularly to Roger Williams, the
founder of colonial Rhode Island43 and William Penn, the founder of
Pennsylvania44-it did not emerge as a strong political force until after the
Great Awakening of circa 1720-1780. 45 Numerous spokesmen for the evan-
gelical cause rose up in the course of the later eighteenth century all along
the Atlantic seaboard-Isaac Backus, John Leland, John Wesley, and a host
of other pastors and pamphleteers. Though the evangelicals had enjoyed
fewer opportunities than the Puritans to institutionalize their views, they
nonetheless had a formidable influence on the early American constitu-
tional experiment.
Like the Puritans, the evangelicals advanced a theological theory of
religious rights and liberties. They likewise advocated the institutional sep-
aration of church and state-the construction of a "wall of Separation be-
tween the Garden of the Church and the Wilderness of the world," to
quote Roger Williams.46 The evangelicals went beyond the Puritans, how-
ever, both in their definition of individual and institutional religious rights
and in their agitation for a fuller separation of the institutions of church
and state. The evangelicals sought to protect the liberty of conscience of
every individual and the freedom of association of every religious group.
Their solution was thus to prohibit all legal establishments of religion, and,
indeed, all admixtures of religion and politics. As John Leland, the fiery
Baptist preacher, put it in a proposed amendment to the Massachusetts
Constitution:
43 See THE CoMP.E WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS (1963) with analysis in EDWIN S. GAUSTAD,
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN AMERICA (1991); Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and
the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REv. 455 (1991). Though he has been lionized in
recent histories of religious liberty in America and was embraced by the eighteenth century Bap-
tist leader Isaac Backus, Roger Williams was not so well known nor so well liked in later eight-
eenth century evangelical circles. See, e.g., WALLACE COYLE, ROGER WILLIAMs: A REFERENCE GUIDE
1-7 (1977); GAUSTAD, supra, at 19-207, 220-21.
44 SeeA COLLECTION OF THE WORKS OFWILLAM PE (1726) with analysis of the contents and
effect of his views in J. WIUIAM FROST, A PERFECr FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA
(1990). Though his writings were better known to eighteenth century evangelicals than those of
Williams, Penn's views on religious liberty also enjoyed only modest authority and influence. See
id. at 10-13; James Wilson, The Study of Law in the United States, in 1 THE WORKS OFJAMES WILSON
67, 71-72 (R.G. McCloskey ed., 1967) (lamenting the habitual disregard for Penn's views among
his peers).
45 On the broad range of evangelical views respecting religion and politics, church and state,
and religious liberty, see THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 134-222 (1986); WILLIAM G. McLouGHLIN, ISAAC
BACKUS AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION (Oscar Handlin ed., 1967); William G. McLough-
lin, The Great Awakening as a Key to the American Revolution, in PREACHERS & POLTICIANS: Two
ESSAYS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLuTiON 1 (Jack P. Greene & William G. McLough-
lin eds., 1977); M.LER, supra note 29. For representative evangelical writings, see ISAAC BACKUS,
ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789 (William G. McLoughlin
ed., 1968) [hereinafter BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM];JOHN LELAND, THE WRITINGS OF
THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND (1845); THE GREAT AWAKENING: DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE
CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (Alan Heimart & Perry Miller eds., 1967); CHAR.Es F.JAMES, DOCU-
MENTAR" HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA (repr. ed. 1971).
46 ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTONS LETERLATELY PRINED, EXAMINED AND ANSVVERED (1644),
reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 392.
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To prevent the evils that have heretofore been occasioned in the world by
religious establishments, and to keep up the proper distinction between
religion and politics, no religious test shall ever be requested as a qualifi-
cation of any officer, in any department of this government; neither shall
the legislature, under this constitution, ever establish any religion by law,
give any one sect a preference to another, or force any man in the com-
monwealth to part with his property for the support of religious worship,
or the maintenance of ministers of the gospel.
47
Later, Leland put the matter even more bluntly: "The notion of a Chris-
tian commonwealth should be exploded forever."48
Religious voluntarism lay at the heart of the evangelical view. Every
individual, they argued, must be given the liberty of conscience to choose
or to change his or her faith. "[N] othing can be true religion but a volun-
tary obedience unto [God's] revealed will," declared the Baptist Isaac
Backus. 49 State coercion or control of this choice-either directly through
persecution and forced collection of tithes and services, or indirectly
through withholding civil rights and benefits from religious minorities-
was an offense both to the individual and to God. A plurality of religions
should coexist in the community, and it was for God, not the state, to de-
cide which of these religions should flourish and which should fade. "Reli-
gious liberty is a divine right," wrote the evangelical preacher Israel Evans,
"immediately derived from the Supreme Being, without the intervention of
any created authority .... [T]he all-wise Creator invested [no] order of
men with the right of judging for their fellow-creatures in the great con-
cerns of religion."
50
Every religious body was likewise to be free from state control of their
assembly and worship, state regulations of their property and polity, state
incorporation of their society and clergy, state interference in their disci-
pline and government. Every religious body was also to be free from state
emoluments like tax exemptions, civil immunities, property donations, and
other forms of state support for the church, that were readily counte-
nanced by Puritan and other leaders. The evangelicals feared state benevo-
lence towards religion and religious bodies almost as much as they feared
state repression. For those religious bodies that received state benefits
would invariably become beholden to the state, and distracted from their
divine mandates. "[I]f civil Rulers go so far out of their Sphere as to take
the Care and Management of religious affairs upon them," reads a 1776 Bap-
tist Declaration, 'ea... Farewel to 'the free exercise of Religion'."51
47 JACK Nips [JOHN LELAND], THE YANKEE SPY (1794), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN PoLrIcAL WRrr-
ING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 971, 989 (Charles Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds.,
1983).
48 LELAND, supra note 45, at 118; see also McConnell, supra note 22, at 1437-43.
49 Isaac Backus, Draft for a Bill of Rights for the Massachusetts Constitution (1779), in
BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 45, at 487.
50 Israel Evans, A Sermon Delivered at Concord, Before the Hon. General Court of the State
of New Hampshire at the Annual Election (1791), in PoLrnICAL SERMONS, supra note 6, at 1062-63.
51 Declaration of the Virginia Association of Baptists (Dec. 25, 1776), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 2, at 660-61.
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The chief concern of the evangelicals was theological, not political.
Having suffered for more than a century as a religious minority in colonial
America, and even longer in Europe, they sought a constitutional means to
free all religion from the fetters of the law, to relieve the church from the
restrictions of the state. In so doing, they developed only the rudiments of
a political theory. They were content with a state that created a climate
conducive to the cultivation of a plurality of religions and accommodated
all religious believers and religious bodies without conditions or controls.
3. Enlightenment Views
Exponents of the enlightenment tradition in America provided a polit-
ical theory that complemented the religious rights theology of the evangeli-
cals. Though American exponents of the enlightenment claimed early
European visionaries such as John Locke and David Hume, they did not
emerge as a significant political voice until the mid-eighteenth century.
The American Revolution served to transform the American enlighten-
ment tradition from scattered groups of elite philosophers into a sizeable
company of intellectual and political lights. Members of this company,
though widely divergent in theological perspective and social position,
were united in their efforts to convert enlightenment ideals into constitu-
tional imperatives and in their adherence to the political views of such
spokesmen as Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and others.
52
The primary purpose of enlightenment writers was political, not theo-
logical. They sought not only to free religion and the church from the
interference of politics and the state, as did the evangelicals, but, more
importantly, to free politics and the state from the intrusion of religion and
the church. Exponents of the enlightenment movement taught that the
state should give no special aid, support, privilege, or protection to organ-
ized religion in the form of tax exemptions, special criminal protections,
administrative subsidies, or the incorporation of religious bodies. Nor
should the state predicate its laws or policies on explicitly religious grounds
or religious arguments, or draw on the services of religious officials or bod-
ies to discharge state functions. As Madison put it in 1822: "[A] perfect
separation between ecclesiastical and civil matters" is the best course, for
"religion & Gov. will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed
together."53 Madison, however, did not press this logic to absolutist conclu-
sions-particularly when it came to the "adiaphora" or nonessentials of
church-state relations. In an 1832 letter to Rev. Jasper Adams, he wrote:
[I] t may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace the line of separation
between the rights of religion and the Civil authority with such distinct-
ness as to avoid collisions & doubts on unessential points. The tendency
to a usurpation on one side or the other, or to a corrupting coalition or
52 On enlightenment views, see generally HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENmENT IN AMERICA
(1976); THE AMERICAN ENUGHTENMENT (Adrienne Koch ed., 1965); R. SHER, SCOTLAND AND
AMERICA IN THE AGE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1990); PAUL M. SPURLIN, THE FRENCH ENLIGHTEN-
MENT IN AMERICA: EsSAYS ON THE TIMES OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1984).
53 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 3, at 102.
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alliance between them, will be best guarded against by an entire absti-
nence of the Gov. from interference in any way whatever, beyond the
necessity of preserving public order, & protecting each sect ag. trespasses
on its legal rights by others.
54
Such views were based on a profound skepticism about organized reli-
gion and a profound fear of an autocratic state. To allow church and state
to be unrestricted, it was thought, would be to invite arbitrariness and
abuse. To allow them to combine would be to their mutual disadvantage-
to produce, in Thomas Paine's words, "a sort of mule-animal, capable only
of destroying, and not of breeding up."5 5 Such views were also based on
the belief that a person is fundamentally an individual being and that reli-
gion is primarily a matter of private reason and conscience and only secon-
darily a matter of communal association and corporate confession. Every
person, James Madison wrote, has the right to form a rational opinion
about the duty he owes the Creator and the manner in which that duty is to
be discharged. 56 Whether that religious duty is to be discharged individu-
ally or corporately is of secondary importance.5 7 -Such views were also
based on a contractarian political philosophy that called for the state to
ensure the maximum liberty of citizens and their associations and to inter-
vene only where one party's exercise of liberty intruded on that of the
other.
Post-revolutionary Virginia proved to be fertile ground for political ex-
ponents of the enlightenment tradition to cultivate these views. Article 16
of the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights, influenced in part by James Madison,
provided:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence; and therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is
the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity,
towards each other.58
The famous Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom, drafted by Thomas Jef-
ferson in 1777 and ultimately passed in 1786, provided even stronger en-
54 Letter from James Madison to Rev. [Jasper] Adams, in 9 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON,
supra note 3, at 484, 487. Madison's notion of a wavering "line of separation between the rights of
religion and the Civil authority" that avails little in "un-essentials" is a more telling metaphor to
describe the enlightenment position than the more famous Jefferson's metaphor of a high and
impregnable "wall of separation between church and state." See infra notes 143-44 & 265-67 and
accompanying text on Jefferson's wall; see also Sidney E. Mead, Neither Church nor State: Reflections
on James Madison's "Line of Separation", 10J. CHURCH & ST. 349 (1968).
55 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 292 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945).
56 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785),
reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 298 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds.,
1973) [hereinafter MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE].
57 In his Detached Memoranda (circa 1817), Madison highlights his distaste for corporate or-
ganized religions by criticizing laws that allowed ecclesiastical bodies to incorporate, to be exempt
from taxation, to accumulate property, and to gain political access through legislative chaplains
and other means. See Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda", 3 WM. & MARY Q. 553-54
(1946).
58 VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XVI, reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 56, at 175.
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lightenment language. The statute begins by celebrating that "Almighty
God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by tempo-
ral punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget
habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the
Holy author of our religion." The statute recounts the ravages of religious
establishment and repression, and their resulting injuries to God, religion,
churches, states, and individuals. It then guarantees: "That no man shall
be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or minis-
try whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened
in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argu-
ment to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion, and that the same
shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities."59
These lofty protections of individual religious rights went hand-in-
hand with the close restrictions on corporate religious rights that were also
advocated by enlightenment exponents. For example, before the turn of
the nineteenth century, the Virginia legislature outlawed religious corpora-
tions (a prohibition still in place in Virginia and West Virginia).60 It also
confiscated substantial tracts of vacant glebe lands held by the Anglican
church, and severely restricted the tax exemptions and immunities ac-
corded to the remaining religious properties. 61 The law of Virginia did not
live entirely by the gospel of the enlightenment, however. Even Jefferson
supported the revision of Virginia's post-revolutionary laws, which included
A Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers;
A Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fastinig and Thanksgiving; and a Bill
Annulling Marriages Prohibited by the Levitical Law, and Appointing the
Mode of Solemnizing Lawful Marriage [in Church].62
4. Civic Republican Views
The "civic republicans," as they have come to be called in recent histo-
ries, were an eclectic group of politicians, preachers, and pamphleteers
who strove to cultivate a set of common values and beliefs for the new na-
tion. Their principal spokesmen were John Adams, Samuel Adams, Oliver
Ellsworth, George Washington, James Wilson, and other leaders-though
the movement attracted considerable support among the spiritual and in-
tellectual laity of the young republic as well. Just as the enlightenment
leaders found their theological allies among the evangelicals, so the repub-
lican leaders found their theological allies among the Puritans. 6 3
59 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 84-86 (Wil-
liam W. Hening ed., 1823) [hereinafter VIRGINIA STATUTES].
60 See Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Rdiious Corporations and the Law, 71 MICH. L. REv.
1499, 1529-33 (1973).
61 See HJ. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA: A STUDY IN THE DEVEL-
OPmENT OF THE REVOLUTION 116 (1910).
62 2 PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 2, at 555-58; ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 24,
at 23-24.
63 On civic republican views, see NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE SACRED CAUSE OF LIBERTY (1977);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBUC, 1776-1787 (1969); and the critical
summary of more recent literature in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth
Reviving?, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1695 (1989).
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To be sure, the civic republicans shared much common ground with
evangelical and enlightenment exponents. They, too, advocated liberty of
conscience for all and state support for a plurality of religions in the com-
munity. They, too, opposed religious intrusions on politics that rose to the
level of political theocracy and political intrusions on religion that rose to
the level of religious establishment. But, contrary to evangelical and en-
lightenment views and consistent with Puritan views, civic republicans
sought to imbue the public square with a common religious ethic and
ethos-albeit one less denominationally specific and rigorous than that
countenanced by the Puritans.
"Religion and Morality are the essential pillars of Civil society," George
Washington declared.64 "[W] e have no government," John Adams echoed,
"armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled
by morality and religion."65 "Religion and liberty are the meat and the
drink of the body politic," wrote Yale President Timothy Dwight.66 Accord-
ing to the civic republicans, society needs a fund of religious values and
beliefs, a body of civic ideas and ideals that are enforceable both through
the common law and through communal suasion. This was what Benjamin
Franklin had called the "Publick Religion"67 (and what is now called the
"civil religion") of America, which undergirded the plurality of sectarian
religions.6 This "Publick Religion" taught a creed of honesty, diligence,
devotion, public spiritedness, patriotism, obedience, love of God, neigh-
bor, and self, and other ethical commonplaces taught by various religious
traditions at the time of the founding. Its icons were the Bible, the Decla-
ration of Independence, the bells of liberty, and the Constitution. Its
clergy were public-spirited Christian ministers and religiously devout politi-
cians. Its liturgy was the proclamations of prayers, songs, sermons, and
Thanksgiving Day offerings by statesmen and churchmen. Its policy was
government appointment of legislative and military chaplains, government
sponsorship of general religious education and organization, and govern-
ment enforcement of a religiously based morality through positive law.69
Civic republicans countenanced state support and accommodation for
religious institutions, for they were regarded as allies and agents of good
government. "[R] eligion and its institutions are the best aid of govern-
ment," declared Nathan Strong, "by strengthening the ruler's hand, and
64 Letter from George Washington to the Clergy of Different Denominations Residing In and
Near the City of Philadelphia (Mar. 3, 1797), in 36 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1745-
1799, at 416 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931).
65 Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the
Militia of Massachusetts (1798), in 9 LIE AND WORKS OFJOHN ADAMS 229 (1854).
66 Timothy Dwight, The Duty of Americans, at the Present Crisis, Illustrated in a Discourse,
Preached on the Fourth ofJuly, 1798 (1798), in PoLIrICAL SERMONS, supra note 6, at 1365, 1380.
67 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 203 (Chester E. Jor-
genson & Frank L. Mott eds., 1932); see Martin E. Marty, On a MedialMoraine: Religious Dimensions
of American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 9, 16-17 (1990).
68 See ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT. AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF TRIAL
(1975); SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE OLD RELIGION IN THE BRAVE NEW WORLD: REFLECTIONS ON THE
RELATION BETWEEN CHRISTENDOM AND THE REPUBLIC (1977); ELLIS SANDoz, A GOVERNMENT OF
LAWS: POLITICAL THEORY, RELIGION, AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (1990).
69 See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); W. Tarver Rountree, Jr.,
Constitutionalism as the American Religion.. The Good Portion, 39 EMORY LJ. 203-07 (1990).
[Vol. 71:3
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF RELIGION
making, the subject faithful in his place, and obedient to the general
laws."v7 . Similarly, the Connecticut Senator Oliver Ellsworth declared: "In-
stitutions for the promotion of good morals, are objects of legislative provi-
sion and support: and among these... religious institutions are eminently
useful and important."71 Civic republicans, therefore, endorsed tax ex-
emptions for church properties and tax support for religious schools, chari-
ties, and missionaries; donations of public lands to religious organizations;
and criminal protections against blasphemy, sacrilege, and interruption of
religious services.7 2 In theory, such state emoluments were to be given in-
discriminately to all religious groups. In reality, certain Protestant groups
received the preponderance of such support, while Quakers, Catholics, and
the few Jewish groups about were routinely excluded.
Post-revolutionary Massachusetts proved to be fertile ground for the
cultivation of these civic republicin views. The 1780 Constitution of Massa-
chusetts, for example, proclaimed that "[i] t is the right as well as the duty of
all men in society, publicly and at stated seasons, to worship the SUPREME
BEING, the great Creator and preserver of the universe."73 For "the public
worship of God and instructions in piety, religion, and morality, promote
the happiness and prosperity of a people, and the security of a republican
government."7 4 The same constitution also insisted that all persons, partic-
ularly political leaders, maintain rigorous moral and religious standards:
"A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the constitution,
and a constant adherence to those of piety, justice, moderation, temper-
ance, industry, and frugality, are absolutely necessary to preserve the advan-
tages of liberty, and to maintain a free government."7 5
These civic republican views also found favor in the Continental Con-
gress, which authorized the appointment of tax-supported chaplains to the
military, tax appropriations for religious schools and missionaries, diplo-
matic ties to the Vatican, and recitations of prayer at its opening sessions
70 NATHAN STRONG, ELECTION SERMON 15 (1790).
71 Oliver Ellsworth, Report of the Committee to Whom Was Referred the Petition of Simeon
Brown and Others .... (1802), in 11 THE PUBUc RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNEcrIcuT 371,
373 (Christopher Collier ed., 1967); see William Casto, Oliver Ellsworth's Calvinism: A Biographical
Essay on Religion and PoliticalPsychology in the Early Republic, 36J. CHURCH & ST. 506, 525 (1994); see
alsoJoseph McKeen, Sermon Preached on the Public Fast in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
15, 17-18 (1793):
Though some modern politicians may think religion of no importance to the state, it is
clear that the experience of all ages and nations is against them.... The more, there-
fore, that the principles of piety, benevolence, and virtue are diffused among a people,
the milder may their government and laws be, and the more liberty are they capable of
enjoying because they govern themselves. But if there be little or no regard to religion
or virtue among a people, they will not govern themselves, nor willingly submit to any
laws, which lay restraint upon their passions; and consequently they must be wretched or
be governed by force: they cannot bear freedom, they must be slaves.
72 See CHESTER J. ANTIEAU El AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABUSHMENT: FORMATION AND
EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAusEs 62-91 (1964); John Witte, Jr., Tax
Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
863, 368-95 (1991).
73 CONSTITUTION OR FRajM OF GovPimENT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS OF
1780, pt. I, art. II.
74 Id. amend, of 1833, art. XXI (replacing pt. I, art. III in the 1780 Constitution).
75 Id. pt. I, art. XVIII.
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and during the day of Thanksgiving.76 The Continental Congress also
passed the Northwest Ordinance in 1787, which provided, in part: "Reli-
gion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and
the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall for-
ever be encouraged."
77
These four views-Puritan, evangelical, enlightenment, and republi-
can-helped to inform the early American experiment in religious rights
and liberties. Each view was liberally espoused by federal and state leaders
in the early American republic, informally in their letters and pamphlets,
and formally in the Constitutional Convention and ratification debates.
Each left indelible marks in the documents and developments of early
American constitutionalism.
B. The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion
Despite the tensions among them, exponents of these four groups
generally agreed upon, what New England Puritan jurist and theologian
Elisha Williams called, "the essential rights and liberties of [religion]."78
To be sure, these "essential rights and liberties" never won uniform articu-
lation or universal assent in the young republic. But a number of enduring
and interlocking principles found widespread support; many of which were
included in state and federal constitutional discussions. These principles
included liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion, pluralism, equality,
separationism, and disestablishment of religion. Such principles remain at
the heart of the American experiment today.
The common goal of these principles was to replace the inherited tra-
dition of religious establishment with a new experiment that rendered reli-
gious rights and liberties the "first freedom" of the constitutional order.
To be sure, a number of writers were reluctant to extend religious liberty to
Catholics and Jews, let alone to Muslims and Indians-and these prejudices
are sometimes betrayed in the earliest drafts of the state constitutions. For
many eighteenth century writers, the term "religion" was synonymous with
Christianity (or even Protestantism), and the discussion of "religious lib-
erty" was often in terms of the "liberty or rights of Christians."7 9 And, to be
sure, some Puritans and civic republicans continued to support what John
Adams called a "slender" form of congregationalist establishment in some
of the New England states-consisting principally of tax collections and
preferences for the congregational churches and schools.80 But such
"compromises" do not deprive the early American experiment, and the
76 See generaly IsAAc A. CORNELISON, THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO CMIL GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A STATE WITHOUT A CHURCH, BUT NOT WITHOUT A RELIGION (1895).
77 Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, art. III, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
78 ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 21 passim.
79 Robert T. Handy, Why it Took 150 Years for Supreme Court Church-State Cases to Escalate, in AN
UNSETrLED ARENA: RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 52, 54-55 (Ronald C. White & Albright G.
Zimmermann eds., 1990).
80 Quoted in Edwin S. Gaustad, Colonial Religion and Liberty of Conscience, in THE VIRGINIA STAT-
UTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 23, 39
(Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988). On early nineteenth century New Eng-
land patterns and practices of religious establishment, see infra notes 170-71 and accompanying
text.
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sentiments that inspired it, of their validity or ongoing utility. By eight-
eenth century European standards, this experiment was remarkably ad-
vanced, and calculated to benefit the vast majority of the population. Many
provisions on religious rights and liberties were cast in broad terms, and
those that were more denominationally specific could easily be extended to
other religious groups, as later state courts repeatedly demonstrated. The
"slender" New England establishments, which ended in 18S33, were a far cry
from the repressive, bloody regimes of the American colonies and of post-
Reformation Europe. The maintenance of such soft establishments was
not seen as inconsistent with guarantees of essential religious rights and
liberties of all citizens within the state.8'
Virtually all eighteenth century writers embraced religious liberty as
the "first liberty" and the "first freedom."8 2 It is "the most inalienable and
sacred of all human rights," wrote Thomas Jefferson.83 'Christian liberty,
both civil and ecclesiastical, is the greatest blessing of the kind, that we can
enjoy," wrote the congregationalist preacherJonathan Parsons, "and there-
fore to be deprived of either, is the greatest injury that we can suffer."8 4 At
the same time, virtually all writers denounced the bloody religious estab-
lishments of previous eras. James Madison reflected commonplaces of the
day when he wrote:
[E]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of
maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary oper-
ation. During almost fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of
Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all
places, pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the
laity, in both, superstition, bigotry, and persecution.... Torrents of blood
have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular arm, to
extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious
opinion.8 5
1. Liberty of Conscience
Liberty of conscience was the general solvent used in the early Ameri-
can experiment in religious liberty. It was universally embraced in the
young republic-even by the most churlish of establishmentarians.8 6 The
81 The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, part I, article II, for example, guaranteed that "no
subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping
God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience." For similar
provisions, see VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. I, art. 111 (1796); N.H. CONST. of 1794, pt. I, arts. IV-V.
When it adopted a constitution in 1818, Connecticut provided expansively: "Sec. 3. The exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever be free
to all persons in this state.... Sec. 4. No preference shall be given by law to any Christian sect or
mode of worship." CON. CoNsr. of 1818, art. I, §§ 3-4.
82 See MI uR, supra note 29; THE FIRsT FREEDOM: RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (James
E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1990).
83 ThomasJefferson, Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia (Oct. 7, 1822), in THE
COMPLETEJEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 958.
84 JONATHAN PARSONs, FREEDOM FROM CIVIL AND EccLrsTrcAL SLAVERY 10 (1774).
85 MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 56, para. 7 at 301, para. 11 at 302.
86 For a good collection of prevailing sentiments, see THE PALLADIUM OF CONSCIENCE, OR,
THE FOUNDATION OF RELIGIOUS LiBRTmy DIsPLAYED, ASSERTED AND ESTABLISHED, AGREEABLE TO ITS
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phrase "liberty of conscience" was often conflated with the phrase "free
exercise of religion," "religious freedom," "religious liberty," "religious priv-
ileges," or "religious rights." James Madison, for example, simply rolled
into one linguistic heap "religious freedom" or "the free exercise of reli-
gion according to the dictates of conscience."87 In another passage, he
spoke of "religious liberty" as the "religious rights . . . of a multiplicity of
sects."88 Such patterns of interwoven language appear regularly in later
eighteenth century writings; one term often implicated and connoted sev-
eral others.89 To read the guarantee of liberty of conscience too dogmati-
cally is to ignore the fluidity of the term in the eighteenth century.
Nonetheless, many eighteenth century writers ascribed distinctive con-
tent to the phrase. First, liberty of conscience protected voluntaism-"the
right of private judgment in matters of religion," the unencumbered ability
to choose and to change one's religious beliefs and adherences. 90 The Pu-
ritan jurist Elisha Williams put this matter very strongly for Christians in
1744 (directly contradicting the rigid opinions of his great grandfather
John Cotton, a century before):
Every man has an equal right to follow the dictates of his own conscience
in the affairs of religion. Every one is under an indispensable obligation
to search the Scriptures for himself... and to make the best use of it he
can for his own information in the will of God, the nature and duties of
Christianity. As every Christian is so bound; so he has an unalienable
right to judge of the sense and meaning of it, and to follow his judgment
wherever it leads him; even an equal right with any rulers be they civil or
ecclesiastical. 91
James Madison wrote more generically in 1785: "The Religion then of
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and
it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate." The evangel-
ical leader John Leland echoed these sentiments in 1791:
Every man must give an account of himself to God and therefore every
man ought to be at liberty to serve God in that way that he can be recon-
cile it to his conscience .... It would be sinful for a man to surrender to
man which is to be kept sacred for God. A man's mind should be always
open to conviction, and an honest man will receive that doctrine which
TRUE AND GENUINE PRINCIPLES ABOVE THE BACK OF ALL PETTY TYRANTS, WHO AT-rEMPT TO LORD IT
OVER THE HUMAN KIND (1773) (a source frequently reprinted in the young republic).
87 VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XVI.
88 Quoted in ANSON P. STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 61
(rev. one vol. ed. 1964).
89 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 22, at 1455-87. For a catalogue of such terms, see JOHN
MELLEN, THE GREAT AND HAPPY DOCrIuNE OF LIBERTY 17-18 (1795); AMOS ADAMS, RELIGIOUS LIB.
ERTY AN INVALUABLE BLESSING 39-40, 45-46 (1768); A MANUAL OF REIGIOUS LIBERTY (3d ed. 1767).
90 ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 21, at 42; see aIsOJOHN LATHORP, A DISCOURSE
ON THE PEACE 29 (1784). The phrase "divine right of private judgment" in matters of religion was
commonplace in the eighteenth century. See, e.g., HUGH FISHER, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF PRIVATE
JUDGMENT, SET IN A TRUE LIGHT (reprint 1790; 1731).
91 ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 21, at 7-8.
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appears the best demonstrated; and what is more common for the best of
men to change their minds?
92
Puritan, enlightenment philosophe, and evangelical alike could agree on this
core meaning of liberty of conscience.
93
Second, and closely related, liberty of conscience prohibited relig-
iously based discrimination against individuals. Persons could not be penal-
ized for the religious choices they made, nor swayed to make certain
choices because of the civil advantages attached to them. Liberty of con-
science, Ezra Stiles opined, permits "no bloody tribunals, no cardinals in-
quisitors-general, to bend the human mind, forceably to control the
understanding, and put out the light of reason, the candle of the Lord in
man."94 Liberty of conscience also prohibits more subtle forms of discrimi-
nation, prejudice, and cajolery by state, church, or even other citizens.
"[N] o part of the community shall be permitted to perplex or harass the
other for any supposed heresy," wrote a Massachusetts pamphleteer, "...
each individual shall be allowed to have and enjoy, profess and maintain
his own system of religion."
95
Third, in the view of some eighteenth century writers, liberty of con-
science guaranteed "a freedom and exemption from human impositions,
and legal restraints, in matters of religion and conscience." 96 Persons of
faith were to be "exempt[ ] from all those penal, sanguinary laws, that gen-
erate vice instead of virtue."97 Such laws not only included the onerous
criminal rules that traditionally encumbered and discriminated against reli-
gious nonconformists, and led to fines, whippings, banishments, and occa-
sional executions of dissenting colonists. They also included more facially
benign laws that worked injustice to certain religious believers-conscrip-
tion laws that required religious pacificists to participate in the military,
oath-swearing laws that ran afoul of the religious scruples of certain believ-
ers, tithing and taxing laws that forced believers to support churches,
schools, and other causes that they found religiously odious.98 Liberty of
conscience required that persons be exempt or immune from civil duties
92 JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE (1791), reprinted in POIrTICAL SER-
MONS, supra note 6, at 1079; see also IssAc BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIB-
RTY (1773), reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 6, at 327; Evans, supra note 50, at 1063.
93 This theory of "religious voluntarism," though consistently espoused by enlightenment
and evangelical proponents, was a more recent importation into Puritan theology. Traditionally,
Puritans and other Calvinists had emphasized the doctrines of predestination and "birthright"
religion, which left less room for voluntary personal choice. For the shifts in late seventeenth and
early eighteenth century Puritan thought to a voluntarist theory, see E. BROoKS HOLIFIELD, THE
COVENANT SEALED: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PURITAN SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY IN OLD AND NErw ENG-
LAND, 1570-1720 (1974); E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD, THE ERA OF PERSUASION: AMERICAN THOUGHT AND
CULTURE, 1521-1680 (1989).
94 STILES, supra note 7, at 56.
95 WoRcmsTRIENsis, NUMBER IV (1776), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLrnICAL WRITING DURING
THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, supra note 47, at 449. The typical caveat follows: "provided it does
not issue in overt acts of treason against the state undermining the peace and good order of
society." Id.
96 MELLEN, supra note 89, at 17 (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 20.
98 See, e.g., PARSONS, supra note 84, at 7-10; BACKUS, APPEAL TO THE PUBUC FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra note 92.
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and restrictions that they could not, in good conscience, accept or obey.99
As Henry Cumings put it: "Liberty of conscience requires not [only] that
persons are... [e]xempt from hierarchical tyranny and domination, from
the usurped authority of pope and prelates, and from every species of per-
secution on account of religion." It requires also that they "stand on equal
ground, and behaving as good members of society, may equally enjoy their
religious opinions, and without molestation, or being exposed to fines or
to forfeitures, or any temporal disadvantages."' 00
It was commonly assumed in the eighteenth century that the laws of
conscientious magistrates would not tread on the religious scruples of their
subjects. 1 1 As George Washington put it in a letter to a group of Quakers:
[I]n my opinion the conscientious scruples of all men should be treated
with great delicacy and tenderness: and it is my wish and desire, that the
laws may always be as extensively accommodated to them, as a due regard
for the protection and essential interests of the nation may justify and
permit.1
02
Where general laws and policies did intrude on the religious scruples of an
individual or group, liberty of conscience demanded protection of reli-
gious minorities and exemption. 0 3 Whether such exemptions should be
accorded by the legislature or by the judiciary, and whether they were per
99 HENRY CUMINGS, A SERMON PREACHED AT BiLLERIcA (Dec. 15, 1796) 12-13 (1797); see also
Thomas Jefferson, Draft of Bill Exempting Dissenters from Contributing to the Support of the
Church (Nov. 30, 1776), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 74 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 1987) (arguing that dissenters be "totally free and exempt from all Levies Taxes and Imposi-
tions whatever towards supporting and maintaining the [established Anglican] church" as a
means of ensuring "equal liberty as well religious as civil" to all "good People"). These arguments
for exemptions from civil impositions were sometimes extended to claiming "exemptions" and
"immunities" from the jurisdiction, discipline, and confessional statements of a local church. See,
e.g., IsAAc FOSTER, A DEFENCE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1780) (a 192 page tract arguing for exemp-
tions from compliance with the imposition of a new confession, the Saybrook Platform, in a local
church).
100 CUMINGS, supra note 99, at 13.
101 See Carol Weisbrod, Comment on Curry and Firmage Artics, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 315, 320-21
(1989) (arguing for such presumptive accommodation of religious scruples, without express
mention in legislation and without necessity for judicial intervention).
102 Letter to the Religious Society Called Quakers (Oct. 1789), in GEORGE WASHINGTON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING: SELEcTIONS FROM WASHINGTON'S LETTERS 11
(Edward F. Humphrey ed., 1932).
103 For contrary sentiments, see, e.g., MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 56,
para. 4 (arguing that equality was compromised by granting certain religious groups "peculiar
exemptions"). Even early writers who thought exemptions were necessary to protect religious
rights and liberties were fully aware that such guarantees could be abused. Thus, on the one
hand, they insisted that liberty of conscience could not be used to excuse breaches of the peace
or of the public order-a caveat that found its way into almost all state constitutions. On the
other hand, they insisted that liberty of conscience not be used as to support sham claims to shirk
one's civil duties. In the same passage where he defends the importance of religious exemption,
for example, Henry Cumings writes:
[T]o admit the plea of conscience, when urged, in order to excuse persons from con-
tributing, in any way, to the necessary defence, support, and well-being of the commu-
nity to which they belong, would evidently be inconsistent with civil union and
terminate in the abolition of society; as it would encourage people to sanctify their sor-
did selfishness and avarice by the sacred name, conscience, in order to free themselves
from a share in the public expences [sic].
CUMINGS, supra note 99, at 13-14. It was thus assumed that the conscientious objector would pay
for his replacement and the oath-forsaker would provide other guarantees of veracity.
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se a constitutional right or simply a rule of equity-the principal bones of
contention among recent commentators' 04 -the eighteenth century
sources at my disposal simply do not clearly say.
All the early state constitutions include a guarantee of liberty of con-
science for all.10 5 The Delaware Constitution provides typical language:
That all men have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences and understand-
ings; and that no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any
religious worship or maintain any religious ministry contrary to or against
his own free will and consent, and that no authority can or ought to be
vested in, or assumed by any power whatever that shall in any case inter-
fere with, or in any manner controul [sic] the right of conscience and
free exercise of religious worship.' 0 6
The Pennsylvania Constitution adds a protection against religious discrimi-
nation: "Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God, be justly
deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his reli-
gious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship." It also provides
an exemption for conscientious objectors: "Nor can any man who is con-
scientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he
will pay such equivalent." 07 The Constitution of New York addressed both
state and church intrusions on conscience, and endeavored
not only to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard against that spiritual
oppression and intolerance wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak
and wicked priests and princes have scourged mankind [and thus] de-
clare, that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be
allowed, within this State, to all mankind.'08
The Constitution of New Jersey provided exemptions from religious taxes,
using typical language: "nor shall any person.., ever be obliged to pay
tithes, taxes, or any other rates, for the purpose of building or repairing
any other church . . . or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be
right." 09
The principle of liberty of conscience also informed some of the fed-
eral constitutional debates on religion. Article VI of the Constitution ex-
plicitly provides: "[N]o religious Test [oath] shall ever be required as a
104 See Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspec-
tiv 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992); Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early
America. The Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10J.L. & RELIGION 367 (1994); William
P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 357 (1990); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions
Under the Fourteenth Amendmen 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106 (1994); Michael W. McConnell, Accommo-'
dation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics , 60 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 685 (1992).
105 For good summaries of these state developments, see CHESTER ANTIEAU ET A.., RELIGION
UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965); John K. Wilson, Religion Under the State Constitutions,
1776-1800, 32J. CHURCH & ST. 753 (1990).
106 DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2.
107 PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, "art. VIII.
108 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII.
109 N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII.
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Qualification" for public office, thereby, inter alia, protecting the religiously
scrupulous against oath-swearing." 0 Early versions of the First Amend-
ment religion clauses included such phrases as: "That any person relig-
iously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of
an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead";"' "The civil
rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or wor-
ship ... nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner,
or on any pretext, infringed";1' 2 "Congress shall make no law. . . to in-
fringe the rights of conscience."" 3 Such phrases were ultimately aban-
doned (though not argued against in the extant records" 4) for the more
pregnant language: "Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]." This language does not leave conscience unpro-
tected, but more protected. Since Congress cannot "prohibit" the free ex-
ercise, the public manifestation, of religion, a fortiori Congress cannot
"prohibit" a person's private liberty of conscience, and the precepts em-
braced therein.
Liberty of conscience was the cardinal principle for the new experi-
ment in religious liberty. Several other "essential rights and liberties of
religion" built directly on this core principle.
2. Free Exercise
Liberty of conscience was inextricably linked to free exercise of reli-
gion. Liberty of conscience was a guarantee to be left alone to choose, to
entertain, and to change one's religious beliefs. Free exercise of religion
was the right to act publicly on the choices of conscience once made, with-
out intruding on or obstructing the rights of others or the general peace of
the community. Already in 1670, the Quaker leader William Penn had
linked these two guarantees, insisting that religious liberty entails "not only
a mere liberty of the mind, in believing or disbelieving... but [also] the
exercise of ourselves in a visible way of worship."" 5 By the next century,
this organic linkage was commonly accepted. Religion, Madison wrote,
"must be left to the convictions and conscience of every man; and it is the
right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.""u 6 For most eight-
110 See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTTUTION 703 (1833); ADAMS & EM-
MERICH, supra note 24, at 61-62.
111 Virginia Version (June 27, 1788), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNtITD STATES OF AMERICA 380 (1894).
112 James Madison's First Proposal, introduced in the House on June 7, 1789, in 1 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 434.
113 Draft proposed. by Fisher Ames of Massachusetts on August 20, 1789 for debate in the
House, in 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 766.
114 Indeed the prevailing assumption in the House Debates of August 15, 1789 about the
religion clauses was, in Representative Carroll's words, that "the rights of conscience are, in their
nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand" and
that "many sects have concurred in [the) opinion that they are not well secured under the pres-
ent Constitution," lacking a bill of rights. Id. at 730.
115 WILLIAM PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (1670), reprinted in 1 A CoLLC-
TION OF THE WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN, supra note 44, at 443, 447.
116 MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 56, para. 1; see also LEvI HART, LIBERTY
DESCRIBED AND RECOMMENDED 14-15 (1775) (distinguishing religious liberty, ecclesiastical liberty,
and spiritual liberty).
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eenth century writers, religious belief and religious action went hand-in-
hand, and each deserved legal protection." 7
Though eighteenth century writers, or dictionaries, offered no univer-
sal definition of "free exercise," the phrase generally connoted various
forms of free public religious action-religious speech, religious worship,
religious assembly, religious publication, religious education, among
others." 8 Free exercise of religion also embraced the right of the individ-
ual to join with like-minded believers in religious societies, which religious
societies were free to devise their own modes of worship, articles of faith,
standards of discipline, and patterns of ritual." 9 Eighteenth century writ-
ers did not speak unequivocally of what we now call group rights, or corpo-
rate free exercise rights, but they did regularly call for "ecclesiastical
liberty," "the equal liberty of one sect... with another," and the right "to
have the full enjoyment and free exercise of those spiritual pow-
ers... which, being derived only from CHRIST and His Apostles, are to be
maintained, independent of every foreign, or other, jurisdiction, so far as
may be consistent with the civil rights of society."' 20
Virtually all of the early state constitutions guaranteed "free exercise"
rights-adding the familiar caveat that such exercise not violate the public
peace or the private rights of others. Most states limited their guarantee to
"the free exercise of religious worship" or the "free exercise of religious
profession"-thereby leaving the protection of other noncultic forms of
religious expression and action to other constitutional guarantees. A few
states provided more generic free exercise guarantees. Virginia, for exam-
ple, guaranteed "the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience"' 2 1-expanding constitutional protection to cultic and noncul-
tic religious expression and action, provided it was mandated by con-
science. The Georgia constitution provided even more flatly: "All persons
whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion; provided it be not
repugnant to the peace and safety of the State." 22 The First Amendment
drafters chose equally embracive language of "the free exercise" of reli-
gion. Rather than using the categorical language preferred by state draft-
ers, however, the First Amendment drafters guaranteed protection only
against Congressional laws "prohibiting" the free exercise of religion.
Whether Congress could make laws "infringing" or "abridging" the free
exercise of religion-as earlier drafts sought to outlaw-was left open to
subsequent interpretation.
117 Cf. infra notes 183-87, 202 & 334 and accompanying text (discussing the belief versus act
dualism).
118 For contemporaneous European understandings of the phrase, which were known to
some eighteenth century American writers, see SCHwARz, supra note 3.
119 See, e.g., ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 21, at 46-65; BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE,
AND CALvINISM, supra note 45, at 345-65; PARSONS, supra note 84, at 14-15; STILES, supra note 7, at
55-99; ADAMs, supra note 89, at 38-46.
120 See HART, supra note 116, at 14; BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 45, at
348-49; A DECLARATION OF CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE PROTESTANT EPIS-
COPAL CHURCH IN MARYLAND, qoted in 1 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 741 (1950).
121 VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16.
122 GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI.
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3. Pluralism
Eighteenth century writers regarded "multiplicity," "diversity," or "plu-
rality," as an equally essential dimension of religious rights and liberties.
Two kinds of pluralism were distinguished.
Evangelical and enlightenment writers urged the protection of confes-
sional pluralism-the maintenance and accommodation of a plurality of
forms of religious expression and organization in the community. Evangel-
ical writers advanced a theological argument for this principle, emphasiz-
ing that it was for God, not the state, to decide which forms of religion
should flourish and which should fade. "God always claimed it as his sole
prerogative to determine by his own laws what his worship shall be, who
shall minister in it, and how they shall be supported," Isaac Backus
wrote.' 23 "God's truth is great, and in the end He will allow it to pre-
vail."1 24 Confessional pluralism served to respect and reflect this divine
prerogative. Enlightenment writers advanced a rational argument. "Differ-
ence of opinion is advantageous in religion," Thomas Jefferson wrote:
The several sects perform the office of a Censor morum over each other. Is
uniformity attainable? Millions of innocent men, women, and children,
since the introduction of Christianity, have been burnt, tortured, fined,
imprisoned; yet we have not advanced one inch towards uniformity....
Reason and persuasion are the only practicable instruments.
125
Madison wrote similarly that "the utmost freedom ... arises from that mul-
tiplicity of sects which pervades America .... for where there is such a
variety of sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and
persecute the rest."' 2 6 Other writers added that the maintenance of multi-
123 BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 45, at 317; see also, e.g., THE FREEMAN'S
REMONSTRANCE AGAINST AN EccLESIASTICAL ESTABLISHMENT 13 (1777).
124 ISAAC BACKUS, TRUTH IS GREAT AND WILL PREVAIL 3 (1781). For comparable sentiments,
see JOHN R. BOLLES, A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF PERSECUTIONS, IN BOSTON AND CONNECTICUT GOVERN-
MENTS 47, 59 (1758). George Washington also expressed comparable sentiments to Roman
Catholics, Quakers, Jews, and other religious minorities in the young republic. See, e.g., Letter to
the Hebrew Congregation of the City of Savannah (May 1790), in GEORGE WASHINGTON ON REU-
GIOUS LIBERTY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, supra note 102, at 12:
May the same wonder-working Deity, who long since delivered the Hebrews from their
Egyptian oppressers, and planted them in the promised land.., still continue to water
them with the dews of Heaven, and to make the inhabitants of every denomination
participate in the temporal and spiritual blessings of that people, whose God is Jehovah.
125 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, Quey 17, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONsrrru-
TION, supra note 99, at 79, 80; see also STILES, supra note 7, at 55-56; THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE
(1776), reprinted in THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 4 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945).
126 James Madison, Debates (June 12, 1788), in3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); see
Smith, supra note 22, at 576-79; Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager Religious Liberty in the
Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 347, 373 (1995); see also Letter from Benjamin Rush toJohn
Armstrong (Mar. 19, 1783), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 99, at 78.
Religion is best supported under the patronage of particular societies .... Religion
could not long be maintained in the world without forms and the distinctions of sects.
The weaknesses of human nature require them. The distinction of sects is as neces-
sary ... towards the perfection and government of the whole as regiments and brigades
are in an army.
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pie faiths is the best protection of the core guarantee of liberty of
conscience.1
27
Puritan and civic republican writers insisted as well on the protection
of social pluralism-the maintenance and accommodation of a plurality of
associations to foster religion. Churches and synagogues were not the only
"religious societies" that deserved constitutional protection. Families,
schools, charities, and other learned and civic societies were equally vital
bastions of religion and equally deserving of the special protections of reli-
gious rights and liberties. These diverse social institutions had several re-
deeming qualities. They provided multiple forums for religious
expressions and actions, important bulwarks against state encroachment
on natural liberties, particularly religious liberties, and vital sources of the-
ology, morality, charity, and discipline in the state and broader commu-
nity. 128 As John Adams put it:
My Opinion of the Duties of Religion and Morality comprehends a very
extensive connection with society at large.... The Benevolence, Charity,
Capacity and Industry which exerted in private Life, would make a family,
a Parish or a Town Happy, employed upon a larger Scale, in Support of
the great Principles of Virtue and Freedom of political Regulations might
secure whole Nations and Generations from Misery, Want and
Contempt. 129
Pluralism was thus not just a sociological fact for several eighteenth
century writers; it was a constitutional condition for the guarantee of true
religious rights and liberties. This was a species and application of
Madison's argument about pluralism in Federalist Paper No. 10-that the
best protection against political tyranny is the guarantee of a multiplicity of
interests, each contending for public endorsement and political expression
in a federalist republic.' 30
127 See EssErrtAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 21, at 40-42; STILES, supra note 7, at 55.
128 See, e.g., 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 44, at 197. See generally WILSON C.
McWnm~Ams, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMEICA 112-23 (1973); CLINTON L. RossrrER, THE
PoLTICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 204 (1963). For earlier pluralist theories
rooted in the work of the sixteenth century Dutch political theorist Johannes Althusius and in
Puritan covenant theology, see respectively CARLJ. FRIEDRIC H, TaRENS OF FEDERALISM IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 11-25 (1968), and Witte, supra note 32, at 581-82.
129 Letter fromJohn Adams to Abigail Adams (Oct. 29, 1775), quoted in HowE, supra note 26,
at 156-57.
130 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (where Madison
foreshadowed this argument about the virtues of religious pluralism). In a pure democracy, he
warned that "[a] zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and
many other points" may lead persons to "mutual animosity," and render them "much more dis-
posed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for the common good." Id. at 79. In a
federalist republic, however,
[t] he influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but
will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious
sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety
of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any
danger from that source.
Id. at 84; see also ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 24, at 43-51 (regarding the linkage of pluralism
and federalism); Glendon & Yanes, supra note 14, at 537-39 (arguing for a "structural approach"
to the religion clause that takes fuller account of the role of institutional and associational dimen-
sions of religion in a democratic society); cf. Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommoda-
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4. Equality
The efficacy of liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion, and con-
fessional pluralism depended on a guarantee of equality of all peaceable
religions before the law. For the state to single out one pious person or
one form of faith for either preferential benefits or discriminatory burdens
would skew the choice of conscience, encumber the exercise of religion,
and upset the natural plurality of faiths. Many eighteenth century writers
therefore inveighed against the state's unequal treatment of religion.
Madison captured the prevailing sentiment: "A just Government... will be
best supported by protecting every Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion
with the same equal hand which protects his person and property; by
neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to in-
vade those of another.''
113
This principle of equality of all peaceable religious persons and bodies
before the law found its way into a number of early state constitutions. The
Constitution of New Jersey insisted that "there shall be no establishment of
any one religious sect in ... preference to another." 32 Delaware guaran-
teed Christians "equal rights and privileges"-a guarantee soon extended
to all religions. 133 Maryland insisted that Christians "are equally entitled to
protection in their religious liberty."'3 4 Virginia guaranteed that "all men
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion.' 35 New York guaran-
teed all persons "free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference." 3 6 Even Massachusetts,
which maintained a "slender" establishment, nonetheless guaranteed that
"all religious sects and denominations, demeaning themselves peaceably,
and as good citizens of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the pro-
tion of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEo. L.J. 1691, 1695-97 (1988) (warning of the dangers of
majoritarianism even where Madison's views of political and religious pluralism are respected).
131 MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 56, para. 8; see also id. para. 4 (arguing
that the general assessment bill in Virginia "violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar bur-
dens [and] by granting others peculiar exemptions"); PaulJ. Weber, James Madison and Religious
Equality, 44 Ray. POL. 163 (1982). For comparable sentiments, see, e.g., THE FIREMAN'S REMON-
STRANCE, supra note 123, at 5, 10-13 (arguing that "every society of Christians [should be] allowed
full, equal, and impartial liberty," and that it is contrary to "scripture, reason, and experience
[that] one society of Christians should be raised to domination over all the rest").
Though the principal concern of eighteenth century writers was to protect equality of reli-
gions before the law, this principle was also on occasion designed to protect nonreligious per-
sons, particularly in furnishing financial support for religious causes. Thus, for example, in
protesting the general assessments in Virginia, Madison wrote:
Above all are they to be considered as retaining an "equal title to the free exercise of
Religion according to the dictates of Conscience." Whilst we assert for ourselves a free-
dom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine
origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to
the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offence against
God, not against man.
MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSrRANcE, supra note 56, para. 4 (emphasis added and foomote
omitted).
132 NJ. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX.
133 Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware Senate, § 3 and amend.
(1776).
134 MD. CONST. of 1776, § XXXIII.
135 VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16.
136 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII.
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tection of the law; and no subordination of any one sect or denomination
to another shall ever be established by law."
3 7
The principle of equality also found its place in erly drafts of the First
Amendment religion clauses, yielding such phrases as: "nor shall the full
and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, in-
fringed"; 38 "Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or
society in preference to others. . .. ";139 and "Congress shall make no law
establishing any particular denomination of religion in preference to an-
other.... 140 Madison, in fact, regarded protection-of the "equal rights of
conscience" as the "most valuable" guarantee for religious liberty, and he
argued that it should be universally guaranteed at both the federal and
state levels.' 41 These provisions and arguments were abandoned for the
more generic guarantees of disestablishment and free exercise at the fed-
eral level-guarantees which presumably are to apply equally to all
religions.
5. Separationism
The principle of separationism was designed primarily to protect reli-
gious bodies and religious believers in their inherent rights.
On the one hand, separationism guaranteed the independence and
integrity of the internal processes of religious bodies. Elisha Williams
spoke for many churchmen when he wrote: "[E]very church has [the] Right
to judge in what manner God is to be worshipped by them, and what Form of
Discipline ought to be observed by them, and the Right also of electing their
own Officers."142 In the mind of most eighteenth century writers, the princi-
ple of separation of church and state mandated neither the separation of
religion and politics nor the secularization of civil society. No eighteenth
century writer would countenance the preclusion of religion altogether
from the public square or the political process. The principle of separa-
tionism was directed to the institutions of church and state, not to religion
and culture.
On the other hand, the principle of separationism also protected the
liberty of conscience of the religious believer. President Thomas Jefferson,
for example, in his famous 1802 Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association,
137 MASS. CONsT. of 1780, amend. XI. Originally, the guarantee applied only to "every denom-
ination of Christians." Id. art Ill.
138 James Madison's First Proposal (June 8, 1789), in 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 21, at
434.
139 Version first rejected by the Senate, then reconsidered and passed by the Senate, on Sep-
tember 3, 1789. 1 JoURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 70 (1802).
140 This version was rejected by the Senate on September 3, 1789. 1&
141 Argument made in support of Amendment to Article I, section 10 in 1 ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS, supra note 21, at 783-84. Madison argued: "If there was any reason to restrain the Govern-
ment of the United States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary
that they should be secured against the State Governments." Id. His initial proposed amendment
to Congress ofJune 8, 1789 sought to make the protection of equality and liberty of conscience
universal, and the disestablishment guarantee binding on the federal government alone: "The
civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any
national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any man-
ner, or on any pretext, infringed." Id. at 434.
142 ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 21, at 46.
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tied the principle of separationism directly to the principle of liberty of
conscience:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and
his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship,
that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not
opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should "make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between church and State. Ad-
hering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the
rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those
sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he
has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.' 43
Separatism thus assured individuals of their natural, inalienable right of
conscience, which could be exercised freely and fully to the point of
breaching the peace or shirking social duties. Jefferson is not talking here
of separating politics and religion. Indeed, in the very next paragraph of
his letter, President Jefferson performed an avowedly religious act of offer-
ing prayers on behalf of his Baptist correspondents: "I reciprocate your
kind prayers for the protection and blessing of the common Father and
Creator of man. .. ."
The principles of pluralism, equality, and separationism-separately
and together-served to protect religious bodies, both from each other
and from the state. It was an open question, however, whether such princi-
ples precluded governmental financial and other forms of support of reli-
gion altogether. Evangelical and enlightenment writers sometimes viewed
such principles as a firm bar on state support, particularly financial sup-
port, of religious beliefs, believers, and bodies. 145 James Madison, for ex-
ample, wrote late in his life:
Every new & successful example ... of a perfect separation between eccle-
siastical and civil matters, is of importance. And I have no doubt that
every new example, will succeed, as every past one has done, in shewing
that religion & Govt. will both exist in greater purity, the less they are
mixed together.' 46
143 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (HA Washington ed., 1854) (emphasis added).
144 Id at 114. Jefferson's use of the phrase "wall of separation between church and state" in a
letter to Baptists might well have been simply an attempt to use an ingratiating metaphor first
expressed in America by Roger Williams and well known in Baptist and other Free Church circles
of the day. See MARK DEWOLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND THE
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1-3 (1965). So far as I know, the phrase
appears nowhere else inJefferson's writings. A more apt phrase to capture this concept of separa-
tionism might well be Madison's "wavering line of separation between the rights of religion and
Civil government." See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
145 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 22; LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (rev. ed.
1967); LEONARD W. LEw, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1986).
146 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 99, at 105-06; see also MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra
note 56, para. 9 ("Distant as it may be in its present form from the Inquisition, it [the general
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Similar sentiments can be found in contemporaneous Baptist tracts, partic-
ularly those of Isaac Backus and John Leland.147 Puritan and republican
writers often viewed such principles only as. a prohibition against direct fi-
nancial support for the religious worship or exercise of one particular reli-
gious group. General governmental support for religion-in the form of
tax exemptions to religious properties, land grants and tax subsidies to reli-
gious schools and charities, tax appropriations for missionaries and military
chaplains, and similar general causes-were considered not only licit, but
necessary for good governance. 148
6. Disestablishment
For some eighteenth century writers, particularly the New England Pu-
ritans who defended their "slender establishments," the roll of "essential
rights and liberties" ended here. For other writers, however, the best pro-
tection of all these principles was through the explicit disestablishment of
religion. The term "establishment of religion" was a decidedly ambiguous
phrase-in the eighteenth century, as much as today. The phrase was vari-
ously used to describe compromises of the principles of separationism, plu-
ralism, equality, free exercise, and/or liberty of conscience. The guarantee
of "disestablishment of religion" could signify protection against any such
compromise.
According to some eighteenth century writers, the guarantee of dises-
tablishment protected separationism. In Jefferson's words, it prohibited
government
from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline,
or exercises.... [and from] the power of effecting any uniformity of time
or matter among them. Fasting and prayer are religious exercises; the
enjoining them an act of discipline. Every religious society has a right to
determine for itself the times for these exercises, and the objects proper
for them, according to their own peculiar tenets .... 149
This view of disestablishment of religion was posed in the penultimate draft
of the establishment clause: "Congress shall make no law establishing arti-
cles of faith or a mode of worship.... ."150-a provision rejected for a mere
generic guarantee.
For other eighteenth century writers, the guarantee of disestablish-
ment protected the principles of equality and pluralism by preventing gov-
ernment from singling out certain religious beliefs and bodies for
preferential treatment. This concept of disestablishment came through re-
assessment for religion] differs from it only in degree. The one is the first step, the other the last
step in the career of intolerance.").
147 See, e.g., THE FREEMAN'S REMONSTRANCE, supra note 123, at 5-11; ISAAC BACKUS, THE INFI-
NITE IMPORTANCE OF THE OBEDIENCE OF FAITH, AND OF A SEPARATION FROM THE WORLD, OPENED
AND DEMONSTRATED 15-31 (2d ed. 1791); ISAAC BACKUS, POLICYAS WELL As HONESTY FORBIDS THE
USE OF SECULAR FORCE IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (1779).
148 See sources cited supra notes 37-39 & 68-72.
149 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (1808), in 11 THE WRITINGs OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 428-29 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904).
150 1 JOURNAL OF SENATE, supra note 139, at 77 (version sent from Senate to House on Sept. 9,
1789).
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peatedly in both state and federal constitutional debates. The New Jersey
Constitution, for example, provided "[T] here shall be no establishment of
any one religious sect... in preference to another."15' Three drafts of the
religion clauses included a similar guarantee: "Congress shall make no law
establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others";152 "Con-
gress shall not make any law . . . establishing any religious sect or soci-
ety";' 53  "Congress shall make no law establishing any particular
denomination of religion in preference to another."
15
For still others, disestablishment of religion meant foreclosing govern-
ment from coercively prescribing mandatory forms of religious belief, doc-
trine, and practice-in violation of the core guarantee of liberty of
conscience. Such coercion of religion inflates the competence of govern-
ment. As Madison wrote:
[It] implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Reli-
gious Truth; or that he may employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy.
The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions
of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world: the second an unhal-
lowed perversion of the means of salvation.
155
Such coercion of religion also compromises the pacific ideals of most reli-
gions. Thomas Paine, who is usually branded as a religious skeptic, put this
well:
All religions are in their nature mild and benign, and united with princi-
ples of morality. They could not have made proselytes at first, by profess-
ing anything that was vicious, cruel, persecuting, or immoral ...
Persecution is not an original feature in any religion; but it is always the
strongly marked feature of all law-religions, or religions established by
law. Take away the law-establishment, and every religion reassumes its
original benignity.156
Such coercion of religion also compromises the individual's liberty of con-
science. As the Pennsylvania Constitution put it: "[N] o authority can or
ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any
case interfere with, or in any manner controul [sic], the right of conscience
in the free exercise of religious worship."' 57
The vague language of the First Amendment-"Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment"-could readily accommodate these
separationist, equality, or noncoercion readings of "disestablishment."
Congress may not "establish religion" outright. Nor may Congress make
laws that "respect" an establishment of religion-that is anticipate, "look
towards," or "regard with deference," such an establishment, to use com-
151 NJ. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX.
152 Version first rejected by the Senate, then reconsidered and passed by the Senate, on Sep-
tember 3, 1789. 1 JOURNAL OF SENATE, supra note 139, at 116.
153 Version defeated by the Senate on September 3, 1789. Id.
154 Version rejected by the Senate on September 3, 1789. 1&. at 117.
155 MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 56, para. 5.
156 THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, pt.l1 (1791), in5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUTION, supra note
99, at 95-96.
157 PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II.
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mon eighteenth century definitions of "respecting." 58 The best way to as-
sess whether a Congressional law violates this prohibition is to see whether
it compromises any one of the cardinal principles of separationism, equal-
ity, and noncoercion protected by the disestablishment guarantee.
7. Interdependence and Incorporation of Principles
For all the diversity of opinion one finds in the Constitutional Conven-
tion debates, pamphlets, sermons, editorials, and broadsides of the eight-
eenth century, most influential writers embraced this roll of "essential
rights and liberties of religion"-liberty of conscience, free exercise of reli-
gion, pluralism, equality, separationism, and disestablishment of religion.
To be sure, many of these terms carried multiple meanings in the later
eighteenth century. And to be sure, numerous other terms and norms
were under discussion. But in the range of official and unofficial sources at
my disposal, these principles were the most commonly discussed and
embraced.
On the one hand, eighteenth century writers designed these principles
to provide an interwoven shield against repressive religious establishments.
Liberty of conscience protected the individual from coercion and discrimi-
natory treatment by church or state officials and guaranteed unencum-
bered, voluntary choices of faith. Free exercise of religion protected the
individual's ability to discharge the duties of conscience through religious
worship, speech, publication, assembly, and other actions without neces-
sary reference to a prescribed creed, cult, or code of conduct. Pluralism
protected multiple forms and forums of religious belief and action, in
place of a uniformly mandated religious doctrine, liturgy, and polity.
Equality protected religious individuals and bodies from special benefits
and from special burdens administered by the state, or by other religious
bodies. Separationism protected individual believers, as well as religious
and political officials, from undue interference or intrusion on each
other's processes and practices. Disestablishment precluded governmental
prescriptions of the doctrine, liturgy, or morality of one faith, or com-
promises of the principles of liberty of conscience, free exercise, equality,
pluralism, or separationism.
On the other hand, eighteenth century writers designed these princi-
ples to be mutually supportive and mutually subservient to the highest goal
of guaranteeing "the essential rights and liberties of religion" for all. No
single principle could by itself guarantee such religious liberty. Simple pro-
tection of liberty of conscience provided no protection of religious actions
or organizations. Pure pluralism could decay into religious relativism and
render the government blind to the special place of religion in the commu-
nity and in the Constitution. Simple guarantees of the equality of religion
could render governments indifferent to the widely divergent needs of dif-
ferent forms of religion. Pure separationism could deprive the church of
all meaningful forms and functions, and deprive states of an essential ally
158 For illustrative eighteenth century texts, see 2 THE COMPAcr EDITION OF THE OxFoRD ENG-
LISH DIaIoNARY 2512 (1971) (under the term "respect").
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in government and social service. Pure nonestablishment could readily rob
society of all common values and beliefs and the state of any effective reli-
gious role. Eighteenth century writers, therefore, arranged these multiple
principles into an interlocking and interdependent shield of religious lib-
erties and rights for all. Religion was simply too vital and too valuable a
source of individual flourishing and social cohesion to be left unguarded
on any side.
It is in the context of this plurality of opinions and panoply of princi-
ples that the First Amendment religion clauses should, in my view, be un-
derstood. The religion clauses were a vital, but only a small, part of this
initial constitutional protection of essential rights and liberties of religion.
They bound only the national government, and (on their face) set only the
outer boundaries to its conduct vis-a-vis religion-forbidding either pre-
scriptions or proscriptions of religion. The religion clauses, together, were
designed to legitimate, and to live off, the state constitutional guarantees of
religious rights and liberties. The guarantees of disestablishment and free
exercise depended for their efficacy both on each other' 59 and on other
religious rights and liberties that eighteenth century writers regarded as
"essential." The guarantees of disestablishment and free exercise standing
alone-as they came to be during the 1940s when the Supreme Court "in-
corporated" these two guarantees into the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendmenti 60-could legitimately be read to have multiple
principles incorporated within them.
Indeed, it might not be too strong to say that the "first incorporation"
of religious rights and liberties was engineered not by the Supreme Court
in the 1940s when it incorporated the religion clauses into the due process
clause, but by the First Congress in 1789 when it drafted the First Amend-
ment religion clauses. 161 This "first incorporation"-if it can be so called-
had two dimensions. First, the pregnant language that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion" can be read as a confir-
mation and incorporation of prevailing state constitutional precepts and
practices. 162 Such state practices included "the slender establishments" of
religion in the New England states, which nonetheless included ample
guarantees of liberty of conscience, free exercise, equality, plurality, and
institutional separation of church and state. 163 Such practices also in-
cluded the "establishments of religious freedom" (in Jefferson's phrase of
1779164) that prevailed in Virginia and other southern and middle states.
The First Amendment drafters seem to have contemplated and confirmed
159 See ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 24, at 3740, 70-73; Glendon & Yanes, supra note 14, at
540-41; Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, in CIusMIANrrY AND DEMOCRACY
IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 101-10 (John Witte, Jr. ed., 1993).
160 See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
161 Some writers have also argued that passage of the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause introduced the first incorporation. See Lash, supra note 104; Poppel, supra note 15, at 254-
56.
162 See AimErAu ET AL., supra note 72, at 132-33, 162-63; WILBUR G. KATZ, REUGION AND AMERI-
CAN CONSTrrUTIONS 9-10 (1964).
163 See generally ANTiFAu Er AL., supra note 72; GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATION-
SHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); KATz, supra note 162.
164 Passed on October 31, 1785, reprinted in MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra
note 56, at 399-401. The act was a slightly revised version ofJefferson's Bill for EstablishingRelgious
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a plurality of constitutional constructions "respecting" religion and its es-
tablishment. Second, the embracive terms "free exercise" and "establish-
ment" can be read to incorporate the full range of "essential rights and
liberties" discussed in the eighteenth century. Eighteenth century writers
often used the term "free exercise" synonymously with liberty of con-
science, equality, separationism, and pluralism.'6 5 They similarly regarded
"non" or "disestablishment" as a generic guarantee of separationism, plu-
ralism, equality, free exercise, and liberty of conscience. 16 6 Read in con-
text, therefore, the cryptic religion clauses of the First Amendment can be
seen to embody-to incorporate-multiple expressions of the "essential
rights and liberties of religion."
II. THE "EXODUS" OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT
A. From Multiplicity to Uniformity
1. State Constitutional Practices
The "essential rights and liberties of religion" forged in the early re-
public came to ready application in the unfolding of the American experi-
ment in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Consistent with the
doctrine of federalism that informed the United States Constitution in gen-
eral and the First Amendment religion clauses in particular, primary polit-
ical responsibility for religion and the church was left to state governments.
By 1833, the constitution of every state guaranteed liberty of conscience
and free exercise of religion for all, and many included further guarantees
of pluralism, equality, separationism, and disestablishment. 167 The most
intrusive and overt forms of religious establishment and state control of
religion fell away. A plurality of religious sects came to flourish in the
states, many supporting their own religious schools, charities, clubs, and
other voluntary associations.
6 8
To be sure, glaring vestiges of religious establishment and discrimina-
tion remained in place among the states. Virginia, for example, revoked
the corporate charters of the Episcopal churches in the 1790s and 1800s
and thereafter sought to confiscate or taxed large portions of their proper-
ties not devoted to religious uses. 16 9 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Vermont adopted equally discriminatory policies towards the properties of
Freedom (June 12, 1779), which had been twice defeated while he was Governor. See CHARLES F.
JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA 68-141 (1900).
165 See supra notes 87-89 & 115-41 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 149-58.
167 For multiple editions of these state constitutions, see THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAws (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909). For a
comprehensive collection of relevant constitutional clauses on religion, see CHESTmJ. ANTIEAU
ET AL., RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS app. at 173-289 (1965).
168 On the emerging plurality of American religion, see generally MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS
IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500 YEARs OF RELIGION IN AMERIA (1984).
169 See ECKENRODE, supra note 61, at 116-55; Kauper & Ellis, supra note 60, at 1529-38. In
Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815), the United States Supreme Court declared inva-
lid the confiscation of church property in Alexandria authorized by Virginia statutes of 1798 and
1801.
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Quakers, Baptists, and Episcopalians, 170 and routinely denied or delayed
delivery of corporate charters, tax exemptions, and educational licenses to
non-Congregational bodies.17 1 New York and New Jersey dealt churlishly
with Unitarians and Catholics throughout the nineteenth century. Few leg-
islatures and courts showed respect for the religious rights of Jews and
Mormons, let alone those of native American Indians and African-Ameri-
can slaves.172 Such abridgements of religious rights and liberties are an
ineradicable part of the American constitutional tradition.
The general guarantees of disestablishment and free exercise of reli-
gion in the state constitutions did not foreclose officials from supporting
religious believers and religious bodies, particularly those that were Chris-
tian. A "mass of organic utterances,"'173 as the Supreme Court later put it,
testify to the presence of a vibrant civil religion, a defacto Christian estab-
lishment, in the America of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-
a civil religion, rooted principally in Puritan and civic republican
rationales.
Government officials, for example, regularly acknowledged and en-
dorsed religious beliefs and practices. "In God We Trust" and similar con-
fessions appeared on currency and stamps. Various homages to God and
religion appeared on state seals and state documents. The Ten Command-
ments and favorite Bible verses were inscribed on the walls of court houses,
schools, and other public buildings. Crucifixes and other Christian sym-
bols were erected in state parks and on state house grounds. Flags flew at
half mast on Good Friday and other high holy days. Christmas, Easter, and
other holy days were official holidays. Sundays remained official days of
rest. Government-sponsored chaplains were appointed to Congress, the
military, and various governmental asylums, prisons, and hospitals. Prayers
were offered at the commencement of each session of Congress and of
many state legislatures. Thanksgiving Day prayers were offered by presi-
dents, governors, and other state officials.' 74 These and numerous other
instances of official endorsement of a civil religion were commonplace in
the early unfolding of the American experiment. 7 5
Government officials afforded various forms of aid to religious groups.
States underwrote the costs of Bibles and liturgical books for rural
churches and occasionally donated land and services to them. Federal and
170 See, e.g.,JAMEs ELLIS, A NARRATIVE OF THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND ISSUE OF THE LATE LAw-Surrs
RELATIVE TO PROPERTY HELD AND DEVOTED TO PIOUS USES IN THE FIRST PRECINCT IN REHOBOTH
(1795);JOHN COSENS OGDEN, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL OPPRESSIONS IN NEw-ENG-
LAND AND VERMONT (1799).
171 For illustrative cases, see MARx DEWOLFE HoWE, CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 27-83 (1952). See alsoJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVERS AND THE POWERS THAT
ARE 139-60 (1987).
172 See generally MORTON BORDENJEws, TURS, AND INFIDELS (1984); LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, THE
AMERICAN KALEIDESCOPE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE CIVIC CULTURE (1990);JOHN HIGHAM, STRAN-
GERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (1955).
173 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
174 Id. at 465-72.
175 See Harold J. Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35
EMORY LJ. 777 (1986); ANTIEAu, Er AL., supra note 105; CORNELISON, supra note 76; PHILIP ScHAFF,
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES, OR THE AMERICAN IDEA OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND ITS
PRACrICAL EFFECTS (1888); STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 88; CARL ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL
CHURCH LAW (1917).
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state subsidies were given to Christian missionaries who proselytized among
the native American Indians. Property grants and tax subsidies were fur-
nished to Christian schools and charities. Special criminal laws protected
the property and clergy of the churches. Tax exemptions were accorded to
the real and personal properties of many churches, clerics, and charities.
Numerous other forms of direct and indirect aid to religion and the
church were countenanced. 76
Government 6fficials predicated some of their laws and policies di-
rectly on the moral and religious teachings of the Bible and the church.
The first public schools and. state universities had mandatory courses in
religion and theology and compulsory attendance in daily chapel and Sun-
day worship services. Employees in state prisons, reformatories, orphan-
ages, and asylums were required to know and to teach basic Christian
beliefs and values. Polygamy, prostitution, pornography, and other sexual
offenses against Christian morals and mores were prohibited. Blasphemy,
sacrilege, and false swearing were still prosecuted. Gambling houses, lot-
teries, fortune-telling, and other activities that depended on fate or magic
were forbidden. In many jurisdictions, these and other laws and policies
were predicated on explicitly religious, and usually Christian, grounds. It
was a commonplace of nineteenth century legal thought that "Christianity
is a part of the common law.'
77
The promulgation of these laws and policies gave rise to some great
debates in state legislatures across the country. The enforcement of these
laws in the courts occasioned some vitriolic dissenting opinions.178 The
arguments for these laws and policies were often framed in classic terms of
Puritanism and civic republicanism; those against sounded in classic terms
of evangelical theology and enlightenment politics. Those inclined to Puri-
tan and civic republican views saw these laws and policies as appropriate
forms of nonpreferential state aid to, and accommodation of, the civic and
sectarian religions of the nation. Those inclined to enlightenment and ev-
angelical perspectives saw them as vestiges of traditional religious establish-
ments and compromises of the ideals of separationism and voluntarism.
2. The Supreme Court Restrained
For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United
States Supreme Court had little occasion to interpret and apply the First
Amendment religion clauses. It was widely understood that state constitu-
tions, not the federal constitution, governed most religious affairs of the
republic. 7 9 The various attempts to develop a general law on religious
liberty applicable to the states and enforceable in the federal courts-most
176 ZoLLMANN, supra note 175.
177 See 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 44, at 671 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 59 (1765) (where Blackstone writes "Christianity is part of the laws of England")).
For examples of thege nineteenth century sentiments in America, see HAROLDJ. BERMAN, FAITH
AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND REUGION 209-19 (1993).
178. For a good sampling, see NOONAN, supra note 171, at 127-232; ANTIEAu, ET AL., supra note
105, at 1-110; HowE, supra note 171.
179 See, e.g., 2JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrruTION 597 (2d ed. 1851); Permoli
v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845) ("The Constitution makes no provision
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notably the agitation in 1875-1876 for Congress to pass the Blaine Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution-were defeated. 180 Few cases in-
volving religious rights and liberties, therefore, came to the United States
Supreme Court-only twenty-three between 1789 and 1940.
These early Supreme Court cases did little to advance the American
experiment. The Court offered only rudimentary analysis of the subject in
a handful of cases concerning the maintenance and division of church
properties. 18 The Court offered an extremely narrow reading of the free
exercise clause to uphold various Congressional restrictions on Mormon
teachings and practices of polygamy. In Reynolds v. United States (1879),
which upheld a federal law prohibiting polygamy against a free exercise
challenge, ChiefJustice Waite took Jefferson's adage of "building a wall of
separation between Church and State ... almost as an authoritative decla-
ration of the scope and effect of the [first] amendment thus secured.' 8 2
The free exercise clause protects religious beliefs, not religious actions, ar-
gued Waite. "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach [religious] actions which were in viola-
tion of social duties or subversive of good order." 83 This Congressional
"freedom," the Court continued in Davis v. Beason (1890), could not be
"comprised" by judicial creations of a free exercise exemption from gen-
eral legislation. To exempt Mormons from criminal prohibitions against
the preaching or practice of polygamy, Justice Field thundered for the
Court, "would shock the moral judgment of the community... [and] of-
fend the common sense of mankind." 8 4 The Davis Court thus upheld the
conviction of a Mormon who swore falsely that he was not a member of a
polygamous organization-and would hear nothing of his argument that
to criminalize religiously based polygamy would be to establish religiously
based monogamy. 185 In another case the same term, the Court upheld
Congress's revocation of the corporate charter of the Mormon church and
the confiscation of its property for its continued adherence to polygamy-
and would hear nothing of its claim to corporate free exercise rights.'86
These early cases left little chance for the "essential rights and liberties of
for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state
constitutions and laws.").
180 See Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HAxv. L. Ray. 939
(1951); F. William O'Brien, The Blaine Amendment 1875-1876, 41 U. DEr. L. RFav. 137 (1963); see
also F. William O'Brien, The States and "No Establishment": Proposed Amendments to the Constititution
Since 1798,4 WASHBURN L.J. 183 (1965) (listing 16 failed attempts to introduce such amendments
to the United States Constitution). Today, there is ample agitation for Congress to pass an
amendment to reintroduce prayer in public schools and to pass an amendment protecting reli-
gious equality. See generally Derek Davis, Editorial: Assessing the Proposed Religious Equality Amend-
ment, 37J. CHURCH & ST. 493 (1995).
181 Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 377 (1887); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288
(1853); Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845); Vidal v. Mayor of Philadel-
phia, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
182 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). For a discussion ofJefferson's view, see
supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
183 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
184 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1890). For a similar result, see Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
185 Davis, 133 U.S. at 336-37.
186 Church ofJesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
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religion" to leaven the Court's First Amendmentjurisprudence. The Court
effectively reduced the religion clauses to a bare-bones guarantee of liberty
of conscience of the individual alone, and even that was compromised.
8 7
In a few cases at the turn of the twentieth century, the Court offered a
more expansive reading of the "essential rights and liberties of religion"
incorporated in the First Amendment. Following the principles of protect-
ing the equality of religion and fostering a plurality of religious forms and
forums in the community, the Court upheld the allocation of federal funds
to help build a Catholic hospital'88 and to help operate a Catholic mission
school among the native American Indians. 189 Consistent with the princi-
ples of separationism and structural pluralism, the Court insisted that reli-
gious bodies may resolve their property disputes among themselves without
state interference, 190 may hold monastic properties in community despite
countervailing private property rules, 191 may appoint their clergy from
abroad without Congressional interference, 192 and may teach their chil-
dren in separate religious schools without undue state intrusion or depriva-
tion.198 In Watson v. Jones (1872), where the Court commanded state
deference to ecclesiastical resolutions of a church property dispute, Justice
Miller offered a crisp rendition of the basics of individual and corporate
religious rights and liberties that generally supported these holdings:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to
practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which
does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not
infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy,
and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no
sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the
expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create
tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the
association... is unquestioned.'
94
Justice Strong amplified the principles of liberty of conscience and separa-
tion of church and state in Bouldin v. Alexander the same term, stating for
the Court: "[W]e have no power to revise or question ordinary acts of
church discipline, or of excision of church membership.... [W] e cannot
decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excom-
municated have been regularly or irregularly cut off."' 95 These early cases,
187 For criticisms, see Smith, supra note 5; Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in
the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious
Conduct, 54 OHio ST. L.J. 713 (1993).
188 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
189 Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
190 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 131 (1872); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
191 Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640 (1914).
192 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
193 Cochran v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273
U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
194 Watson, 80 U.S. at 728-29.
195 Bouldin, 82 U.S. at 139-40. Justice Strong elaborates these sentiments in his Two LECTuREs
UPON THE RELATIONS OF CIVIL LAW TO CHURCH PoLITy, DiscipLINE, AND PROPERTY (1875).
1996]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
though suggestive, were largely incidental to the early unfolding of the
American experiment in religious rights and liberties.
3. Incorporation
This early division of responsibility for the American experiment-
leaving principal political responsibility for religion to state governments
with only occasional involvement by the federal judiciary-changed ab-
ruptly in the 1940s. Under growing pressure to remove the disparities in
treatment of religion among the states and to protect religious minorities,
particularly Jehovah's Witnesses, the United States Supreme Court
breathed new life into the religion clauses.
In the landmark cases of Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)196 and Everson
v. Board of Education (1947),197 the Court incorporated the free exercise
and establishment clauses of the First Amendment into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. With matter-of-fact simplicity, Jus-
tice Roberts declared for the Court in Cantwell:
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that [Fourteenth]
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.
The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as
incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.' 98
This so-called "incorporation doctrine"-which had already been applied
to several other provisions of the 1791 Bill of Rights' 99 -made the religion
clauses binding on both the federal and state governments. The doctrine
allowed the Court for the first time to review state and local policies on
religion and the church. Regarding the federalist premises of 1787 to be
modified by the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, the Supreme
Court set out to create a uniform constitutional law of religious rights and
liberties that would be enforceable throughout the nation. In nearly 100
cases decided after 1940, the Supreme Court took firm control of the
American experiment.
The First Amendment case law of the past half century is eminently
familiar terrain to the cognoscenti.200 My goal is not to restate what has
196 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
197 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
198 Gantwell 310 U.S. at 303. The Court had hinted at its intentions in the dicta of two earlier
cases. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court indicated that the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty clause includes the right to "worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience." Id. at 399. In Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245
(1934), the Court indicated more directly that this same liberty clause includes "the right to
entertain the beliefs, to adhere to the principles and to teach the doctrines" of pacifism. Id at
262. In concurrence, Justice Cardozo put the matter more generically: "I assume for present
purposes that the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment against invasion by the
nation is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the states." Id at 265
(Cardozo, J., concurring).
199 See Poppel, supra note 15, at 254-60, 272-85.
200 Good collections are provided in NooNAN, supra note 171; ROBERT T. MiLLER & RONALD B.
FLowERs, TowARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALIY. CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (4th ed.
1992 & Supp. 1993). Good summaries are provided in Glendon & Yanes, supra note 14;JOHN H.
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already been well and oft stated; it is, rather, to analyze the plight of the
"essential rights and liberties of religion" in the familiar free exercise and
establishment clause cases. The two lines of cases move in opposite direc-
tions in their treatment of these essential rights and liberties. The early
free exercise cases accommodated all the essential rights and liberties of
religion-liberty of conscience, free exercise, equality, pluralism, and
separationism. But the cases of the past fifteen years have effectively re-
duced the free exercise clause to the single and simple guarantee of equal-
ity (or neutrality).201 Most of the early establishment clause cases focused
exclusively on the principle of separationism. But the cases of the past fif-
teen years have effectively brought within the orbit of the establishment
clause the principles of liberty of conscience (coercion), free exercise
equality, and pluralism. The next two sections analyze these inverse
trends.
B. Modem Free Exercise Law
1. Multiple Principles
In Cantwell, the Court incorporated the free exercise clause into the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Thereafter, the Court pro-
ceeded to incorporate into the free exercise clause (and sometimes also
the free speech clause when applied to religion) a number of the "essential
rights and liberties of religion" forged in the early republic. In Cantwell
itself, the Court read the free exercise clause in capacious terms-as a pro-
tection for the beliefs of conscience and religious actions of all religious
faiths, up to the familiar limits of public peace and order, and counter-
vailing constitutional rights. Softening the rigid belief-vs.-act dualism of
the Mormon polygamy cases, Justice Roberts wrote for the majority:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has
a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom
of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law.
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to be-
lieve and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be.... [A] state may by general and nondis-
criminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of
[religious exercise] . .. and may in other respects safeguard the peace,
good order, and comfort of the community.
20 2
GARVEY & FREDERICK SHAUER, THE FiRsT AMENDMENT, A READER 428-633 (2d ed. 1996); Ira C.
Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994); Douglas Laycock, A
Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 409 (1986); Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Carl H. Esbeck,
Table of United States Supreme Court Decisions Relating'to Religious Liberty, 1789-1994, 10 J.L. & RELI-
GION 573 (1994).
201 See infra notes 249-58.
202 Cantwe!4 310 U.S. at 303-04.
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"The essential characteristic of these liberties," Justice Roberts added, with
a nod to the principle of confessional pluralism, "is, that under their shield
many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested
and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary than in our own
country for a people composed of many races and many creeds." 20 3
In more than a dozen subsequent cases over the next two decades, the
Court expanded its reading of the free exercise clause to embrace the full
range of "essential rights and liberties of religion." "[N]o single principle
can answer all of life's complexities," especially those surrounding the
"right t6 freedom of religious belief," Justice Frankfurter wrote wisely (in
an otherwise unwise opinion in 1940).2o4 The Court took his maxim to
heart. Consistent with the principle of liberty of conscience, the Court
held that a public school could not require a student, who was conscien-
tiously opposed, to salute the flag and recite the pledge,20 5 but that a pub-
lic school could allow religious children to be released from schools to
attend religious services off school grounds.2 0 6 It likewise held that a gov-
ernmental official could not require a party, who was conscientiously op-
posed, to swear an oath before receiving citizenship status, 20 7 a property
tax exemption, 20 8 or a state bureaucratic position.2 0 9 "The struggle for
religious liberty has through the centuries been an effort to accommodate
the demands of the State to the conscience of the individual,"Justice Doug-
las wrote for the Court in Girouard v. United States (1946), contrary to the
Court's earlier statements in the Mormon polygamy cases.21 0 Accommoda-
tion of liberty of conscience sometimes requires exemption from generally
applicable government prescriptions.
Consistent with the principle of equality of all peaceable religions
before the law, the Court struck down several permit, licensing, and taxing
ordinances that targeted, and burdened, the core proselytizing activities of
Jehovah's Witnesses, who had emerged prominently in urban America in
the early twentieth century.2 1 1 The Court also struck down an ordinance
203 Id. at 310.
204 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940), rev'd, West Virginia St. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
205 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
206 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Though this case is generally read as an establish-
ment clause case, Justice Douglas reviewed the practice under both religion clauses, finding no
violation. With respect to the free exercise clause, he wrote: "It takes obtuse reasoning to inject
any issue of the 'free exercise' of religion into the present case. No one is forced to go to the
religious classroom and no religious exercise or instruction is brought to the classrooms of the
public schools. A student need not take religious instruction. He is left to his own desires as to
the manner or time of his religious devotions if any." Id at 311.
207 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). This case also turned on the test oath
clause of Article VI.
208 First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1957).
209 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). But cf. In reSummers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (relig-
iously scrupulous applicant received no free exercise right to exemption from an oath required
to stand for the bar).
210 Girouard, 328 U.S. at68. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text (on Mormon polyg-
amy cases).
211 Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 104 (1943);Jones v. Opelika
(II), 319 U.S. 103 (1943);Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418
(1943).
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that permitted church services, but prohibited other forms of religious
speech in a public park.2 12 The principle of equality demanded that only
indiscriminately applied permit requirements 213 or generally applicable
criminal laws could be upheld against free exercise or (religious) free
speech challenges.21 4 Several times in its early free exercise (and free
speech) opinions, the Court stressed the importance of protecting equally
a plurality of forms of faith. Even Justice Frankfurter and Justice Black,
whose interpretations of the religion clauses were often criticized, de-
fended this principle earnestly. "Propagation of belief-or even of disbe-
lief-in the supernatural is protected, whether in church or chapel,
mosque or synagogue, tabernacle or meeting-house," wrote Justice Frank-
furter in the infamous Gobitis case. "Likewise the Constitution assures gen-
erous immunity to the individual from imposition of penalties for
offending, in the course of his own religious activities, the religious views of
others, be they a minority or those dominant in government 215 The free
exercise clause, Justice Black echoed in Everson, mandates that government
"cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists,
Jews, Methodists, Nonbelievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other
faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public
welfare legislation."
216
Consistent with the principles of pluralism and separationism, the
Court in the 1952 case of Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral held that a reli-
gious organization has the free exercise right to resolve their own disputes
over doctrine and liturgy, polity and property without interference by the
state.217 In striking down a New York religious corporation law, passed in
the Cold War era, that rejected the authority of the Moscow Patriarch over
the local Russian Orthodox Church, the Court declared, in the majoity
opinion of Justice Reed:
Here there is a transfer by statute of control over churches. This violates
our rule of separation of church and state.
[It also violates] a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an inde-
pendence from secular control and manipulation-in short, power to de-
cide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the
clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must
now be said have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free
exercise of religion against state interference.
2 1 8
212 Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
213 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding general parade permit, offered
on a sliding fee scale, for all processions).
214 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (breach of peace conviction for
Jehovah's Witness using "fighting words" upheld against free speech and free exercise challenge);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor statute upheld against free exercise
claims of both parent and minor arrested for religious soliciting).
215 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 593.
216 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
217 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
218 Id. at 116.
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2. Compelling State Interest Test
In the landmark case of Sherbert v. Verner (1963), the Court began to
cast these early multi-principled readings of the free exercise clause (and
free speech clause) into a constitutional test.2 1 9 The case raised a precise
free exercise claim to receive a specific state benefit. A Seventh Day Ad-
ventist was discharged from employment, and foreclosed from reemploy-
ment, because of her conscientious refusal to work on Saturday, her
Sabbath Day. She was denied unemployment compensation from the state,
for she had been, according to the applicable statute, discharged "for
cause" and was thus disqualified from the benefit. She appealed, arguing
that the disqualifying provisions of the statute "abridged her right to the
free exercise of her religion," and that the same statute, which explicitly
exempted Sunday Sabbatarians from the same disqualification, was relig-
iously discriminatory. The Supreme Court agreed, with Justice Brennan's
majority opinion stating its principal rationale in terms of liberty of con-
science: " [T] o condition the availability of [state] benefits upon this appel-
lant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith,
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties." 220
Moreover, to disqualify a Saturday Sabbatarian from such benefits but to
grant them to Sunday Sabbatarians "compound [s]" the constitutional viola-
tion with "religious discrimination" in violation of the principle of religious
equality.
22 1
The Court took this case as an occasion to lay the groundwork for a
more nuanced free exercise test in lieu of the simple balancing tests that
had prevailed in earlier cases. Henceforth, a governmental policy or law
that was challenged under the free exercise clause would pass constitu-
tional muster only if it: (1) served a compelling state interest; (2) was pro-
portionately tailored to achieve that interest with the least possible
intrusion on free exercise rights; and (3) was nondiscriminatory against
religion on its face or in application. Governmental policies that met these
criteria could be enforced; those that did not meet such criteria were
either to be struck down, or applied in a manner that minimized, or elimi-
nated, their affront to religion.
222
This "compelling state interest test," as it came to be called, served to
draw together the classic principles of liberty of conscience, free exercise,
equality, pluralism, and separationism, and to accord free exercise protec-
tion to both religious individuals and religious groups. It also served to
mold the free exercise clause into a more delicate and flexible instrument
that could counter both overt and covert forms of religious discrimination,
and could accommodate both traditional and novel needs of the growing
plurality of religious groups seeking First Amendment protection. Justice
Douglas stated this purpose well in his concurring opinion in Sherbert.
219 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1968).
220 Id. at 406.
221 Id.
222 See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 17-18.
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Religious scruples of Moslems require them to attend a mosque on Friday
and to pray five times daily. Religious scruples of a Sikh require him to
carry a regular or a symbolic sword. Religious scruples of a Jehovah's
Witness teach him to be a colporteur, going from door to door, from
town to town, distributing his religious pamphlets. Religious scruples of a
Quaker compel him to refrain from swearing [an oath] and to affirm
instead. Religious scruples of a Buddhist may require him to refrain from
partaking of any flesh.
The examples could be multiplied . .. to show that many people
hold beliefs alien to the majority of our society-beliefs that are pro-
tected by the First Amendment but which could easily be trod upon
under the guise of "police" or "health" regulations reflecting the major-
ity's views.
223
The Supreme Court was consciously adjusting the American experiment to
accommodate the growing religious pluralism of the nation.
As Justice Douglas predicted, the Sherbert compelling state interest test
rendered the free exercise clause a formidable obstacle to both subtle and
overt forms of religious prejudice and insensitivity. Consistent with the
principle of liberty of conscience, the Court extended the technical Sherbert
holding to instances where applicants who sought unemployment compen-
sation had individual scruples, not shared by their co-religionists, against
indirect production of military hardware, 224 were newly converted to their
Sabbatarian beliefs,2 25 or held highly individualized views of the Sab-
bath.2 2 6 Neither the novelty nor the idiosyncrasy of a religious belief
should deprive its adherent from free exercise protection and from receipt
of unemployment compensation. In ChiefJustice Burger's words: "Where
the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct pro-
scribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden
upon religion exists" that violates the free exercise clause.227 Similarly, the
Court struck down state constitutional prohibitions against clerical partici-
223 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 411 (Douglas, J., concurring).
224 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
225 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (free exercise claimant
who converted to Seventh Day Adventist Sabbatarian beliefs two years after employment).
226 Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (free exercise claimant
who had a "personal professed religious belief" in Sabbath as a day of rest, though not a day of
worship).
227 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18. This same principle had, earlier, been denied to Jewish groups
who sought free exercise exemptions from Sunday blue laws. Their argument was that state law
prohibited Sunday work, religious law prohibited Saturday work. This putJewish merchants and
workers at a general commercial disadvantage, and required kosher establishments to be closed
to Jewish communities for two days, instead of one. The Court was not convinced that such
regulations burdened "Jewish religion" per se. See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366
U.S. 617 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961); see also Two Guys from Harrison Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (hold-
ing that Sunday legislation did not violate the establishment clause). After these cases, most
states revised their Sabbath day laws. See genera/!y BarbaraJ. Redman, Sabbatarian Accommodation
in the Supreme Court, 33J. CHURCH & ST. 495 (1991);Jerome A. Barron, Sunday in North America, 79
HARv. L. REv. 42 (1965).
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pation in political office, arguing that: "The State is 'punishing a religious
profession with the privation of a civil right.'
' 228
Not only religious individuals, but also religious groups were able to
claim the panoply of rights and liberties embraced in the "compelling state
interest" test. In a series of free exercise and free speech cases over the
past dozen years, the Court has held that voluntarily organized groups of
religious students must be given equal access to public university and high
school facilities if such access is granted to nonreligious student groups.229
Voluntarily convened religious groups in the community must have equal
access to public school facilities if they are made available to other nonreli-
gious groups.23 0 Student-ran religious publishing groups at a public uni-
versity must have equal access to school subsidies made available to other
religious and nonreligious publishing groups.2 31 In each of these cases, the
principles of voluntarism, equality, nondiscrimination, and religious plural-
ism, collectively, overrode the concerns with the principle of separationism
raised in the establishment clause.
The same free exercise principles have been extended to other reli-
gious groups. Thus religious schools are permitted to choose their teach-
ers without general labor law controls,2 32 and religious employers are
permitted to engage in the religious discrimination that is mandated by
their faith-particularly in the employment of religious officials.2
33 Simi-
larly, religious organizations are permitted to resolve their own disputes
over polity and property, without state intrusion.2 34 In Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich (1976), which prohibited even "marginal review" by a civil
court of an ecclesiastical decision, Justice Brennan speaking for the Court
228 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (quoting 5 WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON, supra
note 3, at 288.
229 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). This "equal access" principle, which was based
on both free exercise and free speech grounds, was later extended to public high schools. See
Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994), which was upheld against establishment clause
challenge in Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
230 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993); see also
Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (holding that the free speech clause
prohibits a ban on "First Amendment activities," including religious solicitation in an airport).
But cf Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (holding that
regulations of religious solicitation in a limited forum like an airport need only satisfy "reasona-
bleness" standards).
231 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). This case was
decided on free speech grounds.
232 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); see also Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981) (applying the Federal Unemployment Tax Act to
church schools).
233 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding Civil Rights
Act provision for religious discrimination by religious employers). The Civil Rights Act bans reli-
gious discrimination by private, nonreligious employers, which the Court has held requires "rea-
sonable accommodations" of employee's religious needs, at no more than "de minimis" cost.
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S.
60 (1987); see David L. Gregory, The Role of Religion in the Secular Workplace, 4 NOTRE DAMEJ.L.
ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 749 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The
Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1987).
234 Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Serbian
East Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). But seeMaryland Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (allowing resolution of some property dis-
putes not involving "doctrinal controversy");Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (allowing secular
disputes within the church to be resolved using "neutral principles of law").
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declared: "Indeed, it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical deci-
sions are reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not
rational or measurable by objective criteria." The Constitution allows "reli-
gious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal
discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating dis-
putes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical
tribunals are created to decide disputes ... the Constitution requires that
civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them."23 5
In its most far-reaching free exercise case, Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972),
the Court required that Amish parents and communities be exempted
from full compliance with compulsory school attendance laws for their chil-
dren, in order to preserve their ascetic, agrarian communitarianism. 2 6
What seemed to impress the Court was that the Amish "lifestyle" was "not
merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious convic-
tion, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living,"
and that these "religious beliefs and attitudes towards life, family and
home.., have not altered in fundamentals for centuries." In the Court's
view, compliance with the compulsory school attendance law "carries with
it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious
practice as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimi-
lated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more
tolerant region."237 Thus the free exercise clause compels an exemption
from a law that clearly, and reasonably, fostered "a compelling state inter-
est" to educate children.
The compelling state interest test-though it had been tailored conve-
niently, and sometimes stretched to the breaking point in the foregoing
cases-did not always yield judgments in favor of religious petitioners, even
in what Ira Lupu has called the "golden age" of religious liberty from 1963
to 1986.238 Where governmental policies met the criteria of the "compel-
ling state interest" test, they were upheld despite their burden on free exer-
cise interests. Thus a Jehovah's Witness child could receive a blood
transfusion, despite the religious objection of conscientiously opposed par-
ents.23 9 Religious pacifists could not withhold their taxes just because a
portion of them supported the military.240 The Amish could not withhold
social security taxes just because of their religious objections to social wel-
fare.24' Hare Krishnas and other proselytizers could not demand exemp-
tion from general restrictions on sale or distribution of religious goods or
articles on state fair grounds.2 42 An itinerant missionary could not claim
235 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25. See generally Louis Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes:
Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 FoRDHAm L REv. 335 (1986); Frederick M. Gedicks,
Toward A Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. RF.v. 99.
236 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
237 Id. at 216-18.
238 Lupu, supra note 15, at 230. For Lupu's critical review of these cases, see Ira C. Lupu,
Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv. 933
(1989).
239 Jehovah's Wimesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
240 United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7 (1974).
241 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
242 Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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free exercise exemptions from state sale and use taxes collected on articles
sold at crusades or through the mails.2 43 A private religious university,
which practiced racial discrimination on religious grounds, could not voice
free exercise objections to the withdrawal of its federal tax exempt status as
a penalty for violating national policy. 244 A religiously affiliated charity
could not claim free exercise exemptions from general labor standards.
2 45
A Scientologist could not take a tax deduction for "auditing or training"
fees paid to the church, 246 nor could Mormon parents take a tax deduction
for funds sent to support their sons' church-supervised mission work.
2 47
The prevailing logic in these cases was that the free exercise clause is
not an absolute license to freedom from all generally applicable govern-
mental policies. It is a protection against generally repressive government
policies, or those that strike at the cardinal religious convictions and con-
duct of a particular individual or group. If one party's, or group's, reli-
gious exercise violates the life, liberty and property of another, threatens
public peace and order, or flouts pressing national policies respecting race,
the military, or taxes, then state interests may outweigh religious interests,
constitutional power may preeempt constitutional rights.
3. Toward a Single Principle
While this generous reading of the "essential rights and liberties of
religion" is today partially preserved in the "equal access" free speech
cases, 248 the general tenor of recent free exercise cases is much more churl-
ish. Goldman v. Weinberger (1986)249 provided the first clear sign of the
Court's shift towards a narrower reading of these essential rights and liber-
ties incorporated in the free exercise clause. There the Court held that the
First Amendment does not prohibit the air force from prohibiting a rabbi
from wearing his yarmulke as part of his military uniform. The Court so
held even though the petitioner served as a psychologist in the mental
health clinic of a military base (not on the front lines), even though for
three years earlier he was accorded this "privilege," and even though nu-
merous other exemptions for religious garb were accorded by the military
dress code. The requirements for military discipline and uniformity, in the
Court's view, outweighed the countervailing religious interests-however
deep-seated and essential they were to the petitioner. In OLone v. Estate of
Shabbaz (1987),2-50 the Court extended this logic from military officials to
prison officials, holding that a change in prison policy that deprived Mus-
lim inmates from attending Jumu'ah, their Friday collective worship ser-
vice, did not violate their free exercise rights. Here the requirements for
243 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
244 BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
245 Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
246 Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
247 Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990).
248 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (decided
on free speech grounds). The initial "equal access" case, Widmar v. Vincent, was decided on free
exercise and free speech grounds. 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).
249 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
250 482 U.S. 342 (1987); see id. at 348.
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security, protection of other prisoners, and other "valid penological objec-
tives," in the Court's view, outweighed the free exercise rights of the Mus-
lim prisoners. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n (1988),25
the Court extended this logic to the U.S. Forest Service, holding that the
free exercise clause does not prohibit the Forest Service's construction of a
road through the middle of a sacred site used for centuries by Indians-
notwithstanding the injunctions of the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act,2 2 and the Court's recognition that this construction "will have
severe adverse effects on the practice of their religion."2 53 Justice
O'Connor defended this holding with blunt literalism:
The crucial word in the constitutional text is "prohibit": "For the Free
Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to
the individual.".. . However much we might wish that it were otherwise,
government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every
citizen's religious needs and desires. A broad range of government activi-
ties-from social welfare programs to foreign aid to conservation
projects-will always be considered essential to the spiritual well-being of
some citizens, often on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs.
Others will find the very same activities deeply offensive, and perhaps in-
compatible with their own search for spiritual fulfillment and with the
tenets of their religion. The First Amendment must apply to all citizens
alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public programs that do
not prohibit the free exercise of religion. The Constitution does not, and
courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands on gov-
ernment, many of them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably
arise in so diverse a society as ours.
2M
In two years, the marginally tenable logic of Goldman-that the special
needs of the military to protect discipline must outweigh individual rights
claims-had been transmuted into the tenuous argument of Lyng--that
busy governmental officials simply do not have time to accommodate the
diverse religious interests of citizens, however sincere, long-standing, or
widely prevalent those religious interests might be.
While these cases may have been isolated to their facts, Employment Di-
vision v. Smith (1990) wove their holdings into a new, and narrow, free exer-
cise test.255 Smith, a native American Indian, periodically ingested peyote
as part of the sacramental rite of the native American church of which he
was a member. Discharged from employment at a drug rehabilitation
251 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
252 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988 & Supp. V 1998). The Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians
their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions
of the American Indian... including but not limited to access to sites, use and posses-
sion of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional
rites.
See generaly HANDBOOK OF AzmEUcAN INDiAN REuGIous FREEDOM (Christopher Vecsey ed., 1991);
Ann E. Beeson, Dances WthJustice: Peyotism in the Courts, 41 EMORY LJ. 1121 (1992).
253 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447; see also id. at 451 (recognizing "devastating effects on traditional
Indian religious practices").
254 Id at 451-52 (citations omitted).
255 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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center because of this practice, he applied for unemployment compensa-
tion from the State of Oregon. Such compensation was denied, on
grounds that peyote ingestion was disqualifying criminal misconduct.
Smith appealed, ultimately to the Supreme Court, claiming a violation of
his free exercise rights. The Court rejected his argument, even though the
case fell easily within the holdings of unemployment compensation cases
inaugurated by Sherbert v. Vemer More importantly, the Court denied the
validity of the Sherbert "compelling state interest" test altogether, and ex-
plained away its application in subsequent cases. Henceforth, Justice Scalia
wrote for the majority, "the right of free exercise does not relieve an indi-
vidual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability'. ... "256 Such laws, when promulgated under proper proce-
dures, must prevail-regardless of the nature of the state's interest and re-
gardless of any intrusion on the interest of a religious believer or body.
Religious petitioners, whose beliefs or practices are burdened by such neu-
tral, generally applicable laws, must seek redress in the legislatures, not the
courts.
2 5 7
Smith effectively reduced the free exercise guarantee to the single prin-
ciple of equality or neutrality, and effectively rejected the various other "es-
sential rights and liberties of religion" that traditionally informed its free
exercise analysis. Since 1990, dozens of lower court cases, presenting local
statutes and practices that are patently discriminatory against religion, have
tested the logic of Smith.258
The Supreme Court itself has only slightly blunted this logic in its most
recent free exercise case, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah
(1993).259 The case posed a free exercise challenge to a city ordinance that
singled out local followers of the Santerian faith to special restrictions and
penalties for engaging in the ritual slaughter of animals-a central practice
of their faith. The majority of the Court chose to apply the narrow Smith
test of free exercise, with little criticism or qualification of the test, and
little effort to square its logic with that of earlier free exercise cases. Even
under this narrow test, however, the Court could strike down the statute in
question, for it was neither a general law, nor neutrally applied. It trans-
parently targeted Santerian believers and practices for special prohibitions.
The effect of Smith has been further blunted by Congress's promulga-
tion of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993.260 The Act
was specifically designed to repudiate the Smith approach to free exercise
256 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
257 For critical commentary, see Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107
HnAv. L. REv. 118 (1993); Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty,
60 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 841 (1992); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Consti-
tutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L REv. 149 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1109 (1990).
258 See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 73
TEx. L. Ray. 209 (1994); Berg, supra note 17; The James R. Browning Symposium for 1994: The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MoNr. L. REv. 1 (1995).
259 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
260 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V
1993)).
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analysis, and to restore the "compelling state interest" test of Sherbert v. Ver-
ner and Wisconsin v. Yoder. The Act provides in pertinent part
(a) In General. Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of'religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) ....
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person's exer-
cise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.2
6'
RFRA has evoked strong commentary by scholars and judges alike.
Some defend it as the only sensible constitutional remedy to end the con-
temporary "crisis of religious liberty,"262 and have put its provisions to im-
mediate use. Others denounce the statute as a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, and have urged that the common law method of ad-
judication based on earlier free exercise cases be used-to draw the sting
from Smith, and, if necessary, reverse it 263 Such a deep-seated and funda-
mental constitutional issue will in due course have to come to the Supreme
Court for resolution. Whether the Court, with the new appointments of
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, is ready to reconsider Smith, or to judge dis-
positively on the constitutionality of RFRA, is not at all clear. Whatever the
outcome of this controversy, Congress's promulgation of RFRA and of sev-
eral other laws governing religious freedom,26 has provided the most sus-
tained challenge in a half a century to the authority, and propriety, of the
Supreme Court's governance of the American experiment in religious
rights and liberties.
C. Modem Disestablishment Law
In the past half century, free exercise jurisprudence has moved from a
multi-principled to a uni-principled reading of the "essential rights and lib-
erties of religion" incorporated in the First Amendment. The trend in es-
tablishment clause jurisprudence has been the exact opposite. A single
principle governed most of the early establishment clause cases; only re-
cently has the Court considered seriously a more multi-principled
approach.
261 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Supp. V 1993).
262 See especially the recent articles by the Act's principal draftsman, Douglas Laycock, supra
notes 222 & 257-58; Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 145
(1995); Laycock & Thomas, supra note 258; see also Flores v. City of Boerne, Texas, No. 95-50306,
1996 WL 23205 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of RFRA).
263 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse
under the Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDozo L. Rxv. 357 (1994); Christopher
L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutiona4 69
N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 437 (1994).
264 See supra note 16.
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1. The Principle of Separationism
The single principle of separationism drove much of the Court's early
analysis of the establishment clause. Justice Black announced this focus in
the ringing dicta of Everson, the Court's first major establishment clause
case:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a per-
son to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be pun-
ished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separa-
tion between church and state.
' 265
Justice Black, and Justice Rutledge in dissent in Everson, described
these sentiments as the "original intent of the eighteenth century fram-
ers."26 6 The historiography of both Justices, however, was at best highly
selective. For, in determining the intent of the framers of the establish-
ment clause, they turned only to enlightenment writers-principally Jeffer-
son and Madison-and read primarily the constitutional history of
Virginia, where these writers had their greatest influence. The Justices did
not consider seriously the multiple opinions of Puritans, evangelicals, and
civic republicans, nor the constitutional experiments or experiences of
other early states besides Virginia. The Justices did not even consider the
nuances of even the sternest enlightenment writers on religion, who were
also concerned with other "essential rights and liberties" besides separa-
tionism. Henceforth, they declared, all federal and state laws and policies
would have to abide by the principle of separationism or be struck down as
unconstitutional. 26
7
Everson was an open invitation to litigation. Numerous state and local
policies on religion that were promulgated under a regime dominated by
Puritan and republican sentiments and justified under sundry principles of
religious rights and liberties, besides separationism, were now open to chal-
lenge. Scores of establishment cases poured into the lower federal courts
after the 1940s. The subject matter of these cases was predictable enough:
challenges to traditional laws and policies involving government endorse-
ments of religious symbols and services; challenges to traditional laws and
policies that afforded governmental aid to religious missions, schools, char-
265 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
266 Id at 8-15, 33-43.
267 For a searching critique, see HowE, supra note 144, ch. 1.
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ities, and others; challenges to traditional laws explicitly predicated on
(Protestant) Christian morals and mores. The new application of the First
Amendment religion clauses to the states, through incorporation doctrine,
encouraged such extensive litigation. The Everson Court's narrow separa-
tionist interpretation of the establishment clause demanded it.
The Court chose to enforce this separationist principle primarily in
cases involving public school education.268 Privately employed religious
teachers could not hold classes in public schools.26 9 Public schools could
not maintain programs that required students to participate in daily
prayer,270 to receive daily instruction in the Bible,27 ' or to hear recitation
of the Lord's prayer.272 Prohibitions against teaching an evolutionary the-
ory, alongside a creation theory, of origins, could not be maintained.273
The Court was not unwavering in its pursuit of separationism. Despite its
strong separationist dicta, Everson itself upheld state policies of furnishing
sectarian school children with public bus transportation. Later, the Court
upheld policies that released religious students from public schools to par-
ticipate in religious rituals,2 74 and that furnished sectarian schools with
textbooks on nonreligious subjects.
2 7 5
2. The Lemon Test
In the landmark case of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court cast this
early separationist impulse into a constitutional test for all cases arising
under the establishment clause-notjust education cases.27 6 Building on
the Walz v. Tax Commission case of the previous term-which had upheld
tax exemptions of church property in part because they fostered "separa-
tion of church and state"2 77-the Court declared that henceforth every
government law challenged under the establishment clause would meet
constitutional muster only if it could satisfy three criteria. The law must:
(1) have a secular, legislative purpose; (2) have a primary result that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) foster no excessive entangle-
ment between church and state.278 Incidental religious "effect" or modest
"entanglement" of church and state was tolerable, but defiance of any of
these criteria was constitutionally fatal.
This reification of the separationist principle rendered the establish-
ment clause a formidable obstacle to many traditional forms and forums of
collaboration between church and state in delivering education. Using this
.test, the Court disallowed state programs that provided salary and service
268 Indeed, 29 of the 40 plus Supreme Court cases heard under the establishment clause since
Everson have involved questions of education.
269 Illinois ex zeL Mc ollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
270 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
271 Abington Township Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
272 Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 377 U.S. 402 (1964).
273 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
274 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
275 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
276 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
277 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
278 Lmo n, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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supplements to religious schools. 279 The Court struck down state programs
that reimbursed religious schools for most costs incurred to administer
standardized tests and to prepare state records2 8 0-although the "actual
costs" for certain tests could be recouped.2 81 The Court disallowed, with
one narrow exception, 282 various state tax schemes that would allow for
deduction or reimbursement for payments of religious school tuition.28
3
The Court disallowed states from loaning or furnishing religious schools
with textbooks, various supplies and films, and various counselling and
other personnel, all of which were made mandatory by state policy.284 The
Court prohibited public schools to hold remedial educational programs to
indigent children in classrooms leased from religious schools,2 85 or to lease
public personnel to teach remedial and enrichment courses in religious
schools. 286 The Court prohibited public school policies of posting the Dec-
alogue,2 87 allowing student-led prayers, 288 or maintaining moments of si-
lence for private prayer or meditation. 289 Very recently, the Court struck
down a local school board practice of offering clergy-led prayers at a mid-
dle school graduation ceremony.2 90 It also outlawed a state's creation of a
single public school district within an exclusively Satmar Hasidic
community.
29 1
These establishment clause cases developed a general logic that was
specific to the issue of the support of religion in public education. The
public school is one of the most visible and well-known arms of the state in
any community, the cases repeatedly argued. One primary purpose of the
public school is to stand as a model of constitutional democracy, and to
provide a vehicle for the communication of democratic values and abilities
to its students. The state compels its students to be at schools; these stu-
dents are perforce young and impressionable. As a consequence, the pub-
lic schools must cling closely to core constitutional and democratic values.
One such value is the consistent separation of church and state taught by
the establishment clause. While some relaxation of constitutional values,
even establishment clause values, might be possible in other public con-
texts-where mature adults can make informed assessments of the values
being transmitted-public schools with their impressionable youths who
are compelled to be there cannot afford such slippage. The constitutional
279 Id.
280 Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); see also New
York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977).
281 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
282 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
283 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); see also
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
284 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). For some exceptions, see Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977).
285 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
286 Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Bal, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
287 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
288 Treen v. Karen B., 455 U.S. 913 (1982).
289 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
290 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
291 Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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values contained in sources like the establishment clause must be rigor-
ously protected.
3. Toward Multiple Principles
This prevailing logic of cases involving religion in public education did
not prevent the Court from granting support for religious schools or stu-
dents. In such cases, the argument that the public school must be a model
and medium of democracy, which impressionable youths are forced to at-
tend, does not readily apply. The Court thus upheld state policies that
provided educational subsidies,2 92 construction grants, 293 or other bene-
fits294 generically to religious and nonreligious institutions alike-so long
as the benefits did not fall primarily to religious schools, or serve to subsi-
dize religious activities. Nor was Lemon violated when state-supported disa-
bility services and benefits were afforded to students who attended
religious schools.2 95
In some of these religious school cases, the Court applied rather tor-
tured and tenuous logic to the Lemon test, yielding results that did not read-
ily square with precedent. This was not just an exercise of disingenuity and
result-oriented jurisprudence. What also seemed to be at work was that the
Court was incrementally importing other "essential religious rights and lib-
erties," besides separationism, into its establishment clause jurisprudence.
State subsidies to religious schools, alongside others, protected equality
and structural pluralism. State disability services to the sectarian school
student preserved the voluntarism and the free exercise right to associate
with others of one's faith. In the 1970s and thereafter, the Burger Court
read into the Sherbert free exercise test an array of "essential rights and lib-
erties." In this same period, the Court seemed to be applying the same
eclectic interpretation to the Lemon establishment test.
The Court's inclination toward a more multi-principled reading of the
establishment clause became bolder and clearer in cases not involving edu-
cation. To be sure, the Court did use the Lemon test to strike down a state
policy that effectively gave churches "veto" power over state decisions to
grant liquor licenses to nearby establishments, 296 a state law guaranteeing a
private sector employee the "absolute right" not to work on his Sabbath, 297
and a state law that granted sale and use tax exemptions exclusively to reli-
gious publications. 298 Even using a rigorous multi-principled reading of
the establishment clause, the Court would have been hard-pressed to up-
hold the practices challenged in those cases. But, in the past decade, the
Court has held that the Lemon test was not violated when Congress afforded
church-affiliated counseling centers, along with others, funding to partici-
292 Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
293 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
294 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
295 Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); see also Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
296 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
297 Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
298 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
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pate in a federal family counseling program,2 99 or when Congress ex-
empted religious employers from full compliance with employment
discrimination laws,300 or when Congress granted public high school stu-
dents equal access to school facilities to perform their religious activities
after school hours.8 0' These cases not only reflected the Court's growing
deference to Congress and growing indifference to the rigors of the Lemon
test; 02 they also reflected a growing appreciation for the principles of vol-
untarism, pluralism, and equality of religions before the law.303
In a few recent cases involving governmental use of religious services
and symbols, the Court invoked these new principles without any pretense
of using the Lemon test. In Marsh v. Chambers (1983), the Court upheld a
state legislature's practice of sponsoring a chaplain and opening its sessions
with prayer-overtly religious conduct and support, by any calculus.
3 0 4
Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Burger invoked civic republican argu-
ments about the utility and validity of supporting features of a civil religion:
"In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years,
there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with
prayer has become part of the fabric of our society. To invoke Divine gui-
dance on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these
circumstances, an 'establishment' of religion [but] simply a tolerable ac-
knowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this coun-
try. . . . '[W] e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being'."30 5 Lynch v. Donnelly (1984)306 extended this logic to up-
hold a municipality's traditional practice of maintaining a creche on a pub-
lic park as part of a holiday display in a downtown shopping area. "There is
an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American life," Chief Justice Burger
argued, giving an ample list of illustrations. Our "constitutional underpin-
nings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas." More-
over, the creche, while of undoubted religious significance to Christians, is
merely a "passive" part of "purely secular displays extant at Christmas" that
"engender a friendly community spirit of good will," "brings people into
the central city and serves commercial interests and benefits merchants.
°30 7
Such benign governmental support for religion cannot be assessed by
"mechanical logic" or "absolutist tests" of establishment; "[i] t is far too late
299 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
300 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
301 Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
302 Today, in fact, the Lemon test is moribund, if not dead. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon
is Dead, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 795 (1993); David 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CAsE W. REs. L.
REv. 865 (1993); see also Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should it be Retained, Reformulated, or
Rejected., 4 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 513 (1990).
303 Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 607 (citing Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)). For
the use of "neutrality" as an organizing First Amendment principle, see Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disagg-regated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990).
304 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
305 Id. at 792 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
306 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
307 Id at 685.
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in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on
the country."3 08
Free exercise law imploded in the 1990s. The Smith Court reduced the
various principles and precedents of the Sherbert test to a simple neutrality
principle, which Congress is now seeking to unmake. Establishment law, by
contrast, has exploded. The Court has effectively replaced the Lemon test
with a battery of new principles, which the Court is now struggling to inte-
grate. Three principles-endorsement, coercion, and neutrality-have
emerged as the most prominent and promising in the Court's recent estab-
lishment cases. None of these principles has as yet consistently captured a
majority of the Court, but each seems to have attracted considerable sup-
port among the Justices.309
According to Justice O'Connor, the establishment clause forbids offi-
cial endorsement of religion. "We live in a pluralistic society," Justice
O'Connor writes. "Our citizens come from diverse religious traditions or
adhere to no particular religious beliefs at all."31 " [G] overnment may gen-
erally not treat people differently based on the God or gods they worship,
or don't worship." 311 It may not
make adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the polit-
ical community. Direct government action endorsing religion or a partic-
ular religious practice is invalid under this approach because it "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, "and an accompanying message to insiders, favored
members of the community."
312
Governmental accommodations of religion, if indiscriminately applied, are
acceptable. "What makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy,
is not that the government is making life easier for some particular reli-
gious group as such. Rather, it is that the government is accommodating a
deeply held belief" 313 This endorsement principle invites a case-by-case
weighing of the multiple principles incorporated in the establishment
clause-and "depends on the hard task ofjudging" among competing prin-
ciples in concrete cases.3 14 Justice O'Connor has put this endorsement
principle to work in several cases. Governmental support of religious sym-
308 Id& at 678, 687. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), the Court imposed
limits on this sweeping rule, holding that a creche prominently displayed in a county court house,
undiluted with other secular symbols, containing verbal religious messages, and with no obvious
redeeming commercial value could not be countenanced. In the same case, however, it upheld
display of a menorah that was located in a less public place of the county courthouse, was buf-
fered by a Christmas tree, and had no verbal religious messages.
309 See Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A Comment on KiryasJoel School District
v. Grumet, 44 EMORY LJ. 433 (1995).
310 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
311 Board of Educ. of KiryasJoel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2497 (1994) (O'ConnorJ., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment).
312 Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch, 465
U.S. at 688 (O'Connor,J., concurring)).
313 KiyasJoel, 114 S. Ct. at 2497.
314 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2525 (1995).
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bols prominently displayed on its own buildings signals endorsement, 15
but modest governmental support of religious symbols in parks does not.
3 16
Governmental programs that give religious students equal access to state
funding or facilities, 31 7 or that support the secular functions of religious
organizations, or that accommodate the special core needs of religious in-
dividuals or groups are necessary protections against outright hostility to
religion.3 1 8 But equality and accommodation give way to endorsement
when, as in KiryasJoe, a public school district boundary follows exactly the
boundary of an exclusively religious Satmar community. In such an in-
stance, religion does affect a person's standing in the political
community.
319
According to justice Kennedy, the establishment clause is violated only
when government "coerce [s] anyone to support or participate in religion
or its exercise, or otherwise act[s] in a way that 'establishes a state religion
or religious faith, or tends to do so.'"320 The establishment clause is thus
designed principally to protect liberty of conscience, 3 2 ' not to purge the
public square or public policy of all religion. "[ P] reservation and transmis-
sion of religious beliefs and worship is [the] responsibility and a choice
committed to the private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pur-
sue that mission," Justice Kennedy writes.3 22 "Government policies of ac-
commodation, acknowledgement or support for religion are an accepted
part of our political and cultural heritage," and should be maintained in a
pluralistic manner.3 23 Only where such accommodations of religion effec-
tively coerce public participation in religious exercises such as prayer (as in
Weisman3 24 ), or merges "political and religious lines" and institutions (as in
KiryasJoelP25 ) should they be struck down. Such governmental actions and
policies invariably invite the kind of religious stigmatizing that impairs true
liberty of conscience. Parties will choose to participate in the prayer or to
abide by the religious line-drawing not out of voluntary conviction, but be-
cause of the civil and social advantages attached to them.
According to Justice Souter, the endorsement principle is not predict-
able enough in its balancing of principles, the coercion principle is not
embracive enough to outlaw more subtle forms of religious discrimination,
and the equality (nonpreferentialist) principle is not protective enough of
nonreligion. In Justice Souter's view, the establishment clause mandates
"governmental neutrality" among religions and between religion and
315 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623-37 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
316 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
317 Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518.
318 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522.
319 Board ofEduc. ofKiryasJoel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2497 (1994) (O'Connor,J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment).
320 Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
321 See supra note 143-44 (on Jefferson's comparable reading).
322 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 589.
323 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissent-
ing in part).
324 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587.
325 KiryasJoe4 114 S. Ct.'at 2500 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
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nonreligion.3 26 This neutrality principle would outlaw a variety of forms of
governmental accommodation of religion or cooperation with religious of-
ficials in the public school or the public square, for such actions would
favor religion over nonreligion.3 27 Religiously neutral policies that afford
an incidental benefit to the religious beliefs or bodies are acceptable.
3 28
Governmental programs that support secular institutions along with reli-
gious institutions delivering secular services are also acceptable-so long as
there is "a searching enquiry to ensure that the institution kept the secular
activities separate from its sectarian ones, with any direct aid flowing only
to the former and never the latter."3 29 Direct funding with public money
of any sectarian or religious activities, however, is "categorically prohib-
ited," for taxpayers of either different or of nonreligious persuasion are
being forced to pay for the religious activities of another.330 "Although
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the
Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed . . .indoctrination
into the beliefs of a particular religious faith."33'
Each of these readings of the establishment clause can find some
anchor in establishment clause precedents and in eighteenth century writ-
ings. Justice Souter's neutrality reasoning, for example, largely repeats the
"equal protection" argument first popularized by Philip Kurland in
1962,332 crystallized shortly thereafter by the Supreme Court, and de-
fended ably by a variety of commentators to this day.333 But the neutrality
principle ultimately depends for its efficacy on easy distinctions between
sectarian and secular, belief and act, private and public dimensions of reli-
gion that have proved to be both theologically fallacious and sociologically
false.3 34 Injustice Souter's formulation of it, the principle demands a level
of governmental blindness to religion that simply cannot be squared with
the demands of the free exercise clause to accommodate and protect reli-
gious beliefs and practices. 335 Moreover, Justice Souter's argument for
neutrality imputes to the framers an exaggerated concern for "nonreli-
gion" in their formulation of the establishment clause. The framers were,
indeed, concerned to protect nonreligious and religious persons alike
326 See KiryasJoel, 114 S. Ct. at 2487-88; Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.
Ct. 2217, 2240 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
327 SeeJustice Souter's illustrations in Weisnan, 505 U.S. at 618-19; and KiryasJoe4 114 S. Ct. at
2488.
328 KiryasJoel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491.
329 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2539 (1995).
330 Id.
331 !d. (quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
332 See PHILIP KURLAND, RELIGION AND LAW (1962).
333 See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). For a searching analysis of the neutrality
principle, see Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 373
(1992).
334 See, e.g., FREDERICK M. GEDICKS, THE RHEroRIc OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICALANALYSIS
OF RELIGION CLAUSEJURISPRUDENCE 25-80 (1995); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF.
How AMERICAN PoLrrcs AND LAW TiruvtuzE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); Alan Freeman & Eliza-
beth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Life and Law, 36 BuFF. L. REv. 237 (1987);
see also supra notes 183-87 & 202 and accompanying text (discussing a dualistic belief versus act
line-drawing in free exercise jurisprudence).
335 See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 104; Arlin M. Adams & Sarah B.
Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DEPAUL L. REv.
317 (1988).
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from general tax assessments and other coerced financial payments for reli-
gious worship and other sectarian activities.336 But coerced tax support for
religion was only one evil that the establishment clause was designed to
outlaw. And this was the only instance where eighteenth century writers on
religious rights were particularly solicitous of the nonreligious person. The
framers' primary concern in crafting the establishment clause was to en-
sure equality not between religion and nonreligion but among religions. It
was to protect liberty of conscience for all religious individuals and equality
of organization and activities for all religious bodies.
3 37
Justice O'Connor's "no endorsement" approach is perhaps the most
suggestive and original of the Court's latest establishment clause offerings.
Her approach derives, in part, from cases interpreting the Lemon test's con-
cern to strike down policies with a "primary religious effect."338 It also de-
rives in part from the founders' concerns to place multiple principles
around the cherished realm of religion. Justice O'Connor's early formula-
tions of this approach have been properly criticized for inviting judicial
inquiry into an elusive "legislative intent respecting religion," and for sub-
stituting judicial analysis of the constitutionality of governmental action
with the "perceptions" of a "reasonable" or "objective observer."3 39 But in-
quiries into "legislative intent" and the "objective observer" have quietly
disappeared from Justice O'Connor's latest establishment clause opin-
ions.34° Moreover, though a troublesome streak of subjectivism continues
to plague this approach, it does inject a healthy dose of moderation and
principled equity into First Amendmentjurisprudence-a measure of "arti-
ficial reason,"'3 41 as Sir Edward Coke once put it. Particularly in recent
cases, Justice O'Connor has repeatedly called the Court to an equitable
balancing of the multiple principles embodied in the establishment clause.
Ironically, this approach stands in marked contrast to her insistence on a
wooden "single-principled" reading of the free exercise clause. 34 2 To im-
port a similar measure of principled equity into interpretation of the free
exercise clause might well put the Court on its way to what Justice
O'Connor has long sought-"a solution to the tension between the reli-
gion clauses."3 43
336 See supra note 131 and accompanying text; see also Laycock, supra note 333, at 376; Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2535-37 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
337 See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
338 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
339 See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the 'No Endorsement" Test 86 MICH. L. REv. 266 (1987); Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as
Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach ofJustice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 151 (1987).
340 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526 (including only a passing quotation about the "rea-
sonable observer"); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 283 (1990) (rejecting inquiry into
legislative intent, and not referring to the "reasonable observer" standard).
341 SeeJohn Underwood Lewis, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1633): His Theory of "Artificial Reason" as
a Context for Modern Basic Legal Theory, 84 L.Q. Rav. 330 (1968).
342 See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
343 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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III. AN INTEGRATION OF THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF
RELIGION
A. The Need for Integration
The vacillations in the Supreme Court's interpretations of the estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses can be explained, in part, on factual
grounds. The Court's application of a cryptic constitutional clause to a
diverse set of complex issues over the course of fifty odd years has inevitably
led to conflicting lines of interpretation. "The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience," Oliver Wendell Holmes reminds us.s4 The
law of religious rights and liberties in America is no exception.
These vacillations, however, also betray the failure of the Court to de-
velop a coherent and comprehensive framework for interpreting and ap-
plying the religion clauses. The Court has tended to rely too heavily on its
mechanical tests of free exercise and establishment, and to use these tests
as a substitute, rather than as a guide, to legal analysis. The Court has
tended to pit the establishment and free exercise clauses against each
other, rather than treating them as twin guarantees of religious rights and
liberties. The Court has been too eager to reduce the religion clauses to
one or two principles, often thereby ignoring the range of interlocking
principles that were originally incorporated into the First Amendment.
The Court needs to develop an integrated approach to First Amend-
ment questions that incorporates the first principles of religious rights and
liberties on which the American experiment was founded, and integrates
them into the resolution of specific cases. Such a framework is easy
enough to draw up in the sterility of the classroom, or on the pages of a law
review article. In the context of the ongoing constitutional experiment in
religious liberty-with the thickly entangled work of federal and state
courts and legislatures--deliberate and provisional _steps are essential to
reaching any type of new framework or synthesis. It might well be neces-
sary, at least as an interim step, that certain lines of cases simply continue.
Individual subjects raising questions of religious rights and liberties, such
as income and property taxation, 45 labor relations,346 intrachurch dis-
putes,3 47 among others might need to be left for a time to develop their
own integrated pockets of principles, precepts, and precedents-without
pretending to project them into other areas of religious liberty law. Reli-
-gious incorporation, zoning, landmark preservation, and related subjects
that generally fall within state (not federal) jurisdiction3 48 might need to
344 OLIVER WENDELL HoLmES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
345 See Witte, Tax Exemption of Church Property, supra note 72.
346 See Lupu, The LingeringDeath of Separatism, supra note 200; Douglas Laycock, Toward a Gen-
eral Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
347 See sources supra note 235.
348 See Kauper & Ellis, supra note 60; Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Lib-
erty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 ViLL. L. REv. 401
(1981); Angela C. Carmella, Landmark Preservation of Church Property, 34 CATH. LAw. 41 (1991);
Angela C. Carmela, Liberty and Equality: Paradigms for the Protection of Religious Property Use, 37 J.
CHURCH & ST. 573 (1995); Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the First
Amendment, 64 B.U. L. REv. 767 (1985).
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remain "selectively unincorporated" for a time and left to the experimenta-
tion of state legislatures and courts. Recent imports into the Court's con-
ceptual constellation, such as "equal access"3 49  and "substantive
neutrality,"350 should be permitted to leaven the jurisprudence a bit
longer. Religion clause jurisprudence should build stronger conceptual
bridges with other clauses of the First Amendment, and even other amend-
ments in the Bill of Rights. There is great wisdom in Justice O'Connor's
cautionary admonition in KiryasJoel:
It is always appealing to look for a single test, a Grand Unified Theory
that would resolve all the cases that might arise under a particular [First
Amendment] clause.... But the same constitutional principle may oper-
ate very differently in different contexts.... And setting forth a unitary
test for a broad set of cases may sometimes do more harm than good.
Any test that must deal with widely disparate situations risks being so
vague as to be useless.... I think a less unitary approach provides a better
structure for analysis. If each test covers a narrower and more homoge-
neous area, the tests may be more precise and therefore easier to ap-
ply.... Perhaps eventually under this structure we may indeed distill a
unified, or at least a more unified [approach].351
Whatever interim steps are taken, the Court-with the help of Con-
gress, state governments, and the academy-must eventually strive toward
the achievement of this "more unified approach." Such an approach could
come in a variety of forms-through another grand synthetic case in the
series of Watson, Cantwell, Everson, Sherbert, and Lemon or through compre-
hensive statutes, restatements,352 codes, or even constitutional amend-
ments.3 53 Such an approach must certainly embrace "the longstanding
traditions of our people," as Justice Scalia urged in response to Justice
O'Connor's opinion in KiryasJoel 354-traditions that are best captured in
the roll of "essential rights and liberties" incorporated into the First
Amendment. Such an approach might well also consider the traditions of
other people-traditions that are today captured in several human rights
instruments of public international law. The way of integration is not only
the way of the past, the original intent of the framers of the religion
clauses. It is also the way of the future, the intent of the emerging intema-
349 See sources cited supra notes 229-31.
350 See Laycock, supra note 303.
351 KiryasJoel 114 S. Ct. at 2498-500 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); see also Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Reliance on
categorical platitudes is unavailing.... When bedrock principles collide, they test the limits of
categorical obstinacy and expose the flaws and dangers of a Grand Unified Theory that may turn
out to be neither grand nor unified.").
352 For provocative prototypes, see Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of
Religious Freedom: Coherene, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 581 (1995); JESSE H.
CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY-. PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION
CLAUSES (1995). For an earlier effort, see THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER: A NATIONAL CELEBRA-
TION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGIous LIBERTY CLAUSES (June 25, 1988), reprinted in ARTICLES
OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOS-
oPHY 123 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990). See also Symposium on the Williams-
burg Charter, 8J.L. & RELIGION 1 (1990).
353 See sources cited supra note 180 (regarding attempts at religious liberty amendments).
354 KiyasJoe 114 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tional and world legal system, of which American constitutional law will
eventually have to be a part.
B. International Human Rights Law as a Source of Integration
Resort to international laws of human rights might seem to be an un-
likely course for achieving a "more unified approach" to the First Amend-
ment.355 Not only are we better at exporting our constitutional ideas and
institutions than importing those of other peoples. But the budding inter-
national law on religious rights and liberties seems, by conventional wis-
dom, to have little that is worth importing. The canon of applicable
international norms has developed only slowly and sporadically since
World War 1.356 Even as more fully developed in the 1980s and 1990s, this
international law is often seen to affect America's foreign diplomatic rela-
tions, not its domestic constitutional law.3 57 Comparatively few interna-
tional cases have been adjudicated, and those that have been reported do
not follow the conventional forms and format of American constitutional
law.358 The international law of religious rights and liberties would thus
seem to be properly left outside the ambit of the First Amendment.
But to keep this parochial veil drawn shut is to deprive the American
experiment of a rich source of instruction and inspiration. Especially at
this time of turmoil and transition in First Amendment law, comparative
legal analysis might well be salutary. There are several distinctive principles
of international law that would confirm, refine, integrate, and elaborate
prevailing First Amendment principles and cases. There is much to be
learned from international and comparative constitutional practices that
differ from our own. The refined hermeneutical principles of case and
statutory analysis at work in other nations might well be used to reform the
somewhat chaotic common law case method at work in this country.3 59
The prioritizing of liberty of conscience, free exercise, and equality princi-
ples at international law might well serve as a prototype for the integration
of free exercise and establishment clause values.3 60 The insistence of inter-
national tribunals that any state abridgements of religious rights and liber-
ties be "necessary" and "proportionate" is highly suggestive for our free
exercise jurisprudence. The heavy emphasis on group religious rights in
355 For illustrations of attempts to introduce it into American law, see, e.g., W. Cole Durham,
Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism and the Transformative Dimension of Religious In-
stitutions, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Ruv. 421.
356 For a masterful summary, see Natan Lerner, Religious Human Rights Under the United Na-
tions, in RELIGIous HuMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECtiVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 79-134 (Johan D.
van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) [hereinafter van der Vyver & Witte eds., RELIGIOUS
HuMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES].
357 See, e.g.,John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and Foreign Relations,
36 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1986); J. BRUCE NicHoLs, THE UNEASY ALLIANCE (1988).
358 On the prevailing statutory and case law of the European community, see T.Jeremy Gunn,
Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in van der Vyver &
Witte eds., RELIGIous HuMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL PERSPECrrVES, supra note 356, at 305-30.
359 For a good illustration, see Lourens M. DuPlessis, Religious Human Rights in South Africa,, in
van der Vyver & Witte eds., RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHrS: LEGAL PERsPECTIvES, supra note 356, at
441-66 (offering a refined "hermeneutical strategy" to interpret new provisions on religious lib-
erty in the South African constitution).
360 See also infra notes 367-71 & 374.
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recent international instruments might provide greater protection to reli-
gious minorities in America.361 The ready merger of constitutional and
civil rights of religion in many legal systems today might prompt us to try to
bridge at least some of the gaps between constitutional and statutory pro-
tections of religious rights. The international doctrine of "a margin of ap-
preciation" for local religious practices 62 could be put to good use in our
federalist system of government with its local jury trials. The eventual reso-
lution of the international debate between "universalism versus relativism"
in human rights3 63 has profound implications for the distinctive American
debate concerning federal and state jurisdiction over religious rights.
1. Religious Rights and Liberties at International Law
Three international legal instruments contain the most critical protec-
tions of religious rights and liberties: (1) the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1966) (the 1966 Covenant); 364 (2) the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) (the 1981 Declara-
tion) ;365 and (3) the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meet-
ing of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe that was promulgated in 1989 (the
Vienna Concluding Document).366 Viewed collectively, these three docu-
ments confirm most of the "essential rights and liberties" of religion em-
bodied in the American experiment, but prioritize them quite differently.
The 1966 Covenant repeats the capacious guarantee of religious rights
and liberties, first announced in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Article 18 reads:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a reli-
gion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in com-
munity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching.
361 On group rights at international law, see Lerner, supra note 356 and Dinah Shelton &
Alexandre Kiss, A Draft Model Law on Freedom of Religion, With Commentary, in van der Vyver & Witte
eds., RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL PERSPECrivES, supra note 356, at 559-92. On implications
of this law for the United States, see W. Cole Durham, Jr., Treatment of Religious Minorities in the
United States, in THE LEGAL STATUS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 323 (European Consortium for Church-State Research, 1994).
362 See generally Clovis C. Morrisson, Jr., Margin of Appreciation in European Human Rights Law, 6
REVUE DES DRorrS DE L'HOMME 263 (1973).
363 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im et al., Universality vs. Relativism in Human Rights, in RELI-
GION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 31-59 (John Kelsay & Sumner B. Twiss eds., 1994).
364 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Covenant].
365 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion or Belief, G-A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/
36/51 (1982) [hereinafter 1981 Declaration].
366 Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act
Relating to the Follow-Up to the ConferenceJan. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 527 [hereinafter Vienna Concluding
Document].
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2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his free-
dom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only
to'such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and free-
doms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have re-
spect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity
with their own convictions.
Article 18 distinguishes between the right to freedom of religion and
the freedom to manifest one's religion-what we normally call liberty of
conscience and free exercise of religion, respectively. The right to free-
dom of religion-the freedom to have, alter, or adopt a religion of one's
choice-is an absolute right from which no derogation may be made and
which may not be restricted or impaired in any manner. Freedom to mani-
fest or exercise one's religion-individually or collectively, publicly or pri-
vately-may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of others. The latter provision is an exhaustive
list of the grounds allowed to limit the manifestation of religion. Legisla-
tures may not limit the manifestation of religion on any other grounds.
3 67
Moreover, the requirement of necessity implies that any such limitation on
the manifestation of religion must be proportionate to its aim to protect
any of the listed interests; such limitation must not be applied in a manner
that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in Article 18. Finally, the power to
limit the manifestation of religion may not be used for purposes other than
those for which that power has been given.3 68 Limitations that have as
their purpose the protection of morals must be based on principles not
deriving exclusively from a single tradition.
3 69
Articles 2 and 26 of the 1966 Covenant require equal treatment of all
persons before the law and prohibit discrimination based, among other
things, on religion. According to international case law, unequal treatment
of equal cases is allowed only if that treatment serves an objective and rea-
sonable purpose and the inequality is proportionate to that purpose.
3 70
367 See Lerner, supra note 356, at 91-93; KarlJosef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression
and Political Freedom, in THE INTERNATIONAL BsLL OF RIGHTs 209 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Alex-
andre C. Kiss, Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 290 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981).
368 1966 Covenan supra note 364, art. 4(3).
869 See U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 22(48) concerning Article 18,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add. 4 (1993) [hereinafter Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 22(48)]; see also W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative
Framework, 'in van der Vyver & Witte eds., REUGIOus HuMAN RIGHTs: LEGAL PERSPECrIVES, supra
note 356, at 1, 25-86 (similarly interpreting the comparable language of Article 9 of the European
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms).
870 See, e.g., Communication No. 172/1984, S.W.M. Broeks v. The Netherlands, U.N. GAOR Hum.
Rts. Comm., 29th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 139 U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (1987) (expressing the view of
the U.N. Human Rights Committee in S.WM Broeks v. The Netherlands).
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The Human Rights Committee, established under the 1966 Covenant,
has made it explicit in its General Comment No. 22 (48) concerning Article
18 that:
The terms belief and religion are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is
not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and
beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of
traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any
tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reasons,
including the fact that they are newly established, or represent religious
minorities that may be the subject of hostility by a predominant religious
community.
3 71
In its General Comment the Human Rights Committee has further
clarified that the freedom to manifest one's religion
includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic
affairs, such as, inter alia, the freedom to choose their religious leaders,
priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious
schools and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or
publications.3
7 2
The 1981 Declaration elaborated what the 1966 Covenant adum-
brated.3 73 The Declaration includes (1) prescriptions of religious rights for
individuals and institutions; (2) proscriptions on religious discrimination,
intolerance, or abuse; (3) provisions specific to the religious rights of par-
ents and children; and (4) explicit principles of implementation. Like the
1966 Covenant, the 1981 Declaration on its face applies to "everyone,"
whether "individually or in community," "in public or in private."
Articles 1 and 6 of the 1981 Declaration set forth a lengthy catalogue
of "rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion"-illustrating
more concretely the ambit of what we would call "liberty of conscience"
and "free exercise of religion." Such rights include the right (1) to worship
or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and
maintain places for these purposes; (2) to establish and maintain appropri-
ate charitable or humanitarian institutions; (3) to make, to acquire, and to
use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the
rites or customs of a religion or belief; (4) to write, to publish, and to dis-
seminate relevant publications in these areas; (5) to teach a religion or
belief in places suitable for these purposes; (6) to solicit and receive volun-
tary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions; (7)
to train, to appoint, to elect, or to designate by succession appropriate lead-
ers called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
(8) to observe days of rest and to celebrate holy days and ceremonies in
accordance with the precepts of one's religion or belief; and (9) to estab-
371 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22(48), supra note 369.
372 Id.
373 The following paragraphs are adapted from W. Cole Durham et al., The Future of Rel'gious
Liberty in Russia: Report of the De Burght Conference on Pending Russian Legislation Restricting Religious
Liberty, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1994).
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lish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in
matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.
Like the 1966 Covenant, the 1981 Declaration allows the manifestation
of religion to be subjected to appropriate state regulation and adjudica-
tion. The 1981 Declaration permits states to enforce against religious indi-
viduals and institutions general regulations designed to protect public
safety, order, health', or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others. It is assumed, however, that in all such instances, the grounds for
such regulation are enumerated and explicit, and such regulations abide
by the international legal principles of proportionality and necessity.
The 1981 Declaration includes more elaborate provisions concerning
the religious rights of children and their parents. It guarantees the right of
parents or guardians to organize life within the family and to educate their
children in accordance with their religion or beliefs. Such parental re-
sponsibility, however, must be discharged in accordance with the "best in-
terests of the child." At minimum, the parents' religious upbringing or
education "should not be injurious to his physical or mental health or to
his full development." Although the drafters debated at length the poten-
tial conflicts between the parent's right to rear and educate their children
in accordance with their religion and the state's power to protect the best
interests of the child, they offered no specific principles to resolve these
disputes. Presumably, different systems will be afforded a "margin of ap-
preciation" in this area.
The 1981 Declaration includes suggested principles of implementa-
tion and application of these guarantees. It urges states to take all "effec-
tive measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on. the grounds of
religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political,
social and cultural life." It urges states to remove local laws that perpetuate
or allow religious discrimination, and to enact local criminal and civil laws
to combat religious discrimination and intolerance.
The 1989 Vienna Concluding Document extends these norms, and
their implementation, particularly for religious groups. Principles 16 and
17 provide a clear distillation of principles that is worth quoting in full:
16. In order to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and
practice religion or belief the participating States will, inter alia,
(a) take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination
against individuals or communities, on the grounds of religion or belief
in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in all fields of civil, political, economic, social and cul-
tural life, and ensure the effective equality between, believers and
nonbelievers;
(b) foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of
different communities as well as between believers and nonbelievers;
(c) grant upon their request to communities of believers, practising or
prepared to practise their faith within the constitutional framework of
their states, recognition of the status provided for them in their respec-
tive countries;
1996]
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(d) respect the right of religious communities to establish and maintain
freely accessible places of worship or assembly, organize themselves ac-
cording to their own hierarchical and institutional structure, select, ap-
point and replace their personnel in accordance with their respective
requirements and standards as well as with any freely accepted arrange-
ment between them and their State, solicit and receive voluntary financial
and other contributions;
(e) engage in consultations with religious faiths, institutions and organi-
zations in order to achieve a better understanding of the requirements of
religious freedom;
(f) respect the right of everyone to give and receive religious education
in the language of his choice, individually or in association with others;
(g) in this context respect, inter alia, the liberty of parents to ensure the
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their
own convictions;
(h) allow the training of religious personnel in appropriate institutions;
(i) respect the right of individual believers and communities of believers
to acquire, possess, and use sacred books, religious publications in the
language of their choice and other articles and materials related to the
practice of religion or belief;
(0) allow religious faiths, institutions and organizations to produce and
import and disseminate religious publications and materials;
(k) favorably consider the interest of religious communities in participat-
ing in public dialogue, inter alia, through mass media.
17. The participating States recognize that the exercise of the above-
mentioned rights relating to the freedom of religion or belief may be
subject only to such limitations as are provided by law and consistent with
their obligations under international law and with their international
commitments. They will ensure in their laws and regulations and in their
application the full and effective implementation of the freedom of
thought, conscience, religion or belief.
2. International and American Laws Compared
These international legal instruments are not formally binding law on
the United States. They are not "incorporated" into American constitu-
tional law, and can be ignored with legal (though perhaps not always with
diplomatic) impunity. Nonetheless, as collective expressions of world opin-
ion on the subject, they carry ample moral and intellectual suasion, and
anticipate at least some of the. cardinal principles of the budding world
legal order. This is not the place for an exhaustive analysis of American
case law against international human rights standards. But a few general
comparisons between these two traditions might be profitably made to sug-
gest new ways to develop a "unified framework" for the First Amendment.
International human rights law both confirm and prioritize several of
the "essential rights and liberties of religion" that have long been part of
the American experiment. The principles of liberty of conscience, individ-
ual and corporate free exercise of religion, and equality of religions before
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the law form the backbone of the international law of religious lights and
liberties. Liberty of conscience, with its inherent protections of volunta-
rism and against noncoercion, are absolute rights from which no deroga-
tion can be made. The manifestation or exercise of religion can be
regulated only to protect either other fundamental rights or public health,
safety, and welfare and only when the religious intrusion is "proportionate"
to achieving that narrowly stated need. Equality of religions before the law
is not only to be protected but to be affirmatively fostered by the state in all
dimensions of social living. To achieve the mandated goals of equality and
nondiscrimination on grounds of religion, exemptions from generally ap-
plicable laws and policies are sometimes necessary, as are affirmative state
actions to protect religions or to undo past religious repression.37 4
International human rights law assume a vast pluralism of confessions
and faiths. Multiple forms of religious belief and expression are deserving
of special religious rights protection-whether ancient or new, individual
or communal, internal or external, private or public, permanent or tran-
sient. The special religious functions of parents, teachers, and clerics are
given particular attention and protection at international law. The rights
of religious minorities and nontraditional religions are given special
weight, and states are obligated to be particularly solicitous of their pecu-
liar needs.
Particularly the Vienna Concluding Document also protects the princi-
ple of structural pluralism, and the basic autonomy of various religious or-
ganizations that is assumed in the American principle of separation of the
institutions of church and state. Religious associations have rights to func-
tion in expression of their founding religious beliefs and values, which the
state cannot compromise except on stated grounds that are necessary and
proportional. Churches, temples, mosques, tribes, and other religious
groups thus have rights to organize, assemble, worship, and enforce certain
religious laws. Parents and families have rights to rear, educate, and disci-
pline children in expression of their religious convictions. Religious pub-
lishers and suppliers have rights to produce the particular products needed
for their religious cultus. Religious schools have rights to educate and dis-
cipline children in accordance with the basic norms and habits of their
religious traditions.
Conspicuously absent from international human rights instruments
are the more radical demands for separationism, rooted in certain forms of
American enlightenment reasoning and reified in the popular American
metaphor of a "wall of separation." Everson, McCollum, Engel and other
early establishment cases assumed that religious liberty requires the separa-
tion of church and state, and the cessation of state support for religion.
374 This "affirmative religious action" by states is especially advocated by Eastern European
and African writers. See Haroldj. Berman, Religious Rights in Russia at a Time of Tumultuous Transi-
tion: A Historical Theory, in van der Vyver & Wite eds., RELIGIOUS HuMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL PERSPEC-
TrvES, supra note 356, at 285; Tainds F61desi, The Main Problems of Religious Freedom in Eastern
Europ in van der Vyver & Witte eds., RLuuIGous HuMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL PERsPEcTrvEs, supra note
356, at 243; Makau wa Mutua, Limitations on Religious Rights: Problematizing Religious Freedom in the
African Context in van der Vyver & Witte eds., RELIGIous HuMAN PiTGn's: LEGAL PERSPEcrrVEs,
supra note 356, at 417.
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Only the secular state can guarantee religious liberty, it was argued, and
only separation can guarantee its neutrality on religious matters. Such sep-
arationist logic is not widely shared around the world, nor reflected in in-
ternational human rights instruments. International law and many
domestic laws regard the material and moral cooperation of church and
state as conducive, and sometimes essential, to the achievement of religious
liberty. Indeed, today a number of religious groups in the former Soviet
bloc and sub-Saharan Africa regard restitution and affirmative state action
towards religion as a necessary feature of any religious lights regime-if
nothing else, to undo and overcome past confiscation and repression 35
Similarly, some Catholic groups in Latin America urge cooperation of reli-
gious and political bodies to preserve the "Catholicization" of public life
and culture.376 Islamic revivalists in various countries urge similar arrange-
ments to enhance the "Islamicization" of the community.3 77 Jewish groups
argue similarly to protect the Jewish character of the State of Israel.378 Ab-
solute separationists in this country have fewer allies abroad than is conven-
tionally assumed.
If applied in the United States, the international law on liberty of con-
science would confirm the "compelling state interest" test anticipated in
Cantwell, Barnette, and their early progeny and distilled in Sherbert, Yoder,
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.37 9 It would confirm the
"noncoercion" reading of the establishment clause reflected most recently
in Lee v. Weisman. It would confirm the multiple forms of religious accom-
modation for individual believers upheld under both religion clauses and
in various statutes. Conversely, the international principle that liberty of
conscience is a nonderogable right runs directly counter to the wooden
reading of the free exercise clause introduced in the late nineteenth cen-
tury Mormon polygamy cases-Reynolds, Davis, and Latter Day Corpora-
tion 380-and resurrected this past decade in Lyng, Smith and their lower
court progeny.
38'
The international law on equality would applaud the "equal access"
cases from Widmar to Rosenberger as necessary protections of equality.
3 8 2 It
would confirm the various statutes, regulations, and cases that foster reli-
gious equality in the workplace, the school, and in public facilities. It
would likewise uphold the application of general taxing, licensing, parad-
375 See, e.g., Irwin Coder, Jewish NGOs and Religious Human Rights: A Case Study, in Witte & van
der Vyver eds., RELIGIous HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGIOUS PEPSPEcrIVES, supra note 3, at 235; F61desi,
supra note 374; Mutua, supra note 374; Martin Heckel, The Impact of Religious Rules on Public Life in
Germany, in van der Vyver & Witte eds., RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHrs: LEGAL PERspEcrIVEs, supra
note 356, at 191.
376 See, e.g., Paul E. Sigmund, Religious Human Rights in Latin America, in van der Vyver & Witte
eds., RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHrs: LEGAL PERSPEcTIVES, supra note 356, at 467.
377 See Said Arjomand, Religious Human Rights and the Principle of Legal Pluralism in the Middle
Eas in van der Vyver & Witte eds., RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGH'TS: LEGAL PERSPECTrIVES, supra note
356, at 331.
378 See Coder, supra note 375; Asher Maoz, Religious Human Rights in the State of Israe4 in van
der Vyver & Witte eds., RELIcious HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL PERSPEcTriS, supra note 356, at 349.
379 See supra notes 202-47 and accompanying text.
380 See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
381 See supra notes 249-58 and accompanying text.
382 See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
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ing, reporting, land use, and other statutes and regulations to religious
bodies, finding no ready violation of free exercise rights if such regulations
are equally applied to all. Conversely, international law would have little
patience with the patently discriminatory treatment of certain religious mi-
norities in America. The Court's failure to accommodate the distinctive
theology of polygamous marriage among Mormons,3 83 the special sabbata-
rian needs ofJews,3 84 the religious worship patterns of Muslims,3 85 and the
site-specific and nontraditional rituals of native Americans 386 would run di-
rectly counter to the cardinal principle of equality and nondiscrimination
mandated by several international instruments.
The international principle of structural pluralism would endorse the
lines of cases protecting the forms and functions of religious bodies,
whether worship centers, religious schools, charities, publishing houses,
and others. Cases upholding general regulations of these bodies in fur-
therance of health, safety, and welfare, and in exercise of taxing and police
power would likewise pass muster. Similarly cases upholding generically
available governmental support for religion-in the form of tax exemp-
tions, tax subsidies, or equal access to public facilities would find ready
support in the principle of structural pluralism. The principle of structural
pluralism, especially as elaborated in the Vienna Concluding Document,
would look askance, however, at a case like Jones v. Wo/f which permitted
government resolution of intrachurch disputes involving "neutral princi-
ples" of law. The "deference test" of Watson, Kedroff and Miliviojevich and
its progeny, and the corporate free exercise rights over religious polity and
policy reflected in Amos would be more sensitive to the principle of struc-
tural pluralism.387 This principle might also look askance at a case like Bob
Jones University v. United States388 that withheld tax exempt status to a reli-
gious university that discriminated on race in its matriculation and employ-
ment decisions on the basis of its religious convictions.38 9 International law
would protect even unpopular and prejudicial policies of a religious body
that are firmly grounded and sincerely held-so long as such policy did not
threaten or violate the life or limb of its members, or impair any party's
liberty of exit from the religious body.3 90
The absence of a principle of "disestablishment" at international law
would not call into question the entire line of establishment clause cases.
Many of these cases, as we have seen, serve to protect the principles of
liberty of conscience, equality, and pluralism in a manner consistent with
prevailing international norms. But when there is a "clash" between such
383 See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text; see also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S.
14 (1946) (upholding federal ban on transporting plural wives across state boundaries).
384 See supra note 227.
385 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabbaz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
386 See supra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
387 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); see supra notes 194-95, 217-18 & 232-35 and accompany-
ing text.
388 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
389 See Lerner, supra note 356, at 103-06. But such discrimination, even on religious grounds,
might well run afoul of the international Declaration and Convention on Racial Discrimination.
390 See generally NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION AT INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1991).
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principles and concerns for religious establishment, international law
would give preference to the former-as do many American cases uphold-
ing the principle of accommodation.3 91 Moreover, the realm of educa-
tion-where parental religious rights and preferences receive especially
strong protection at international law-is not the ideal place for undue
zealotry in the purging of religion and the pursuit of secularism. To be
sure, international law would not countenance any more than American
law coerced religious exercises in school classrooms-such as mandatory
participation in prayers, pledges, confessions of faith, Bible reading, and
the like-even against countervailing parental preferences.3 92 But the
Supreme Court's purging of tax-supported schools of virtually all religious
symbols, texts, and traditions-in favor of "purportedly neutral and secu-
lar" tropes-stands in considerable tension with international principles of
religious equality and of parental religious rights.
Finally, the absence of a universal definition, or common method of
defining, religion in American law would meet with harsh criticism at inter-
national law. The current system of leaving such definitions to individual
states and statutes, courts and agencies has introduced a bewildering array
of definitions of "religion." Some courts and legislatures make a simple
"common sense" inquiry as to the existence of religion. Others defer to
the good faith self-declarations of religion by the claimant. Others seek to
find sufficient analogies between existing religions and new religious claim-
ants. Others insist on evidence of a god or something transcendent that
stands in the same position as a god. Others analyze the motives for forma-
tion of the religious organization or adoption of a religious belief, the pres-
ence and sophistication of a set of doctrines explicating the beliefs, the
practice and celebration of religious rites and liturgies, the degree of for-
mal training required for the religious leaders, the strictures on the ability
of members to practice other religions, the presence and internal enforce-
ment of a set of ethical rules of conduct, and other factors.393 All this re-
sults in considerable inequality and discriminatory treatment of religious
claims and claimants.
We need not necessarily adopt the capacious definition of religion set
out in international human rights instruments-particularly given that, in
American law, one definition of religion must be usefully applied in both
religion clauses. But the term "religion" must be assigned some consistent
boundaries to be useful at least for a constitutional rights regime. No uni-
versal definition can easily embrace every religious dimension of modern
culture. No bright line tests can readily resolve all penumbral cases. Fair-
ness commands as broad a legal definition of religion as possible, so that
no legitimate religious claim is excluded. Prudence counsels a narrower
definition, so that not every claim becomes religious (and thus no claim
becomes deserving of special religious rights protection). To define "reli-
gion" too closely is to place too much trust in the capacity of the lexicon or
391 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-75 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963).
392 See supra notes 268-73 & 279-91 and accompanying text.
393 See Witte, supra note 72, at 402-07.
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the legislature. To leave the term undefined is to place too much faith in
the self-declarations of the claimant or the discernment of local judges and
administrators.
In my view, the functional and institutional dimensions of religion de-
serve the strongest emphasis in defining the constitutional realm of reli-
gious rights and liberties in America. Of course, religion viewed in its
broadest terms embraces all beliefs and actions that concern the ultimate
origin, meaning, and purpose of life, of existence. It involves the responses
of the human heart, soul, mind, conscience, intuition, and reason to reve-
lation, to transcendent values, to, what Rudolf Otto once called, the "idea
of the holy."3 94 But such a definition applied at modern constitutional law
would render everything (and thus nothing) deserving of special constitu-
tional protection. Viewed in a narrower institutional sense, religion em-
braces a creed, a cult, a code of conduct, and a confessional community.3 95
A creed defines the accepted cadre of beliefs and values concerning the
ultimate origin, meaning, and purpose of life. A cult defines the appropri-
ate rituals, liturgies, and patterns of worship and devotion that give expres-
sion to those beliefs. A code of conduct defines the appropriate individual
and social habits of those who profess the creed and practice the cult. A
confessional community defines the group of individuals who embrace and
live out this creed, cult, and code of conduct, both on their own and with
fellow believers. By this definition, a religion can be traditional or very
new, closely confining or loosely structured, world-avertive or world-affirm-
ative, atheistic, nontheistic, polytheistic, or monotheistic. Religious claims
and claimants that meet this definition, in my view, deserve the closest
consideration.
CONCLUSIONS
Francis-Bacon, the so-called "father" of the experimental method, had
three prudential instructions to correct experiments that had gone "awry."
First, return to first principles. Second, reinterpret your experience with
the experiment in light of these first principles, and adjust your efforts
where such first principles have been defied. Third, compare your experi-
ment with others, and adopt or adapt their techniques where appropri-
ate.3 96 This Article has applied Bacon's prudential instructions to what the
eighteenth century founders called "the American experiment in religious
rights and liberties."
The "first principles" of the American experiment were forged in the
later eighteenth century. Theologians and jurists, believers and skeptics,
churchmen and statesman all participated in their creation and confirma-
tion-puritans, evangelicals, enlightenment philosophers, and civic repub-
894 RUDOLF OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY-. AN INQUIRY INTO THE NON-RATIONAL FAcGrOR OF
THE IDEA OF THE DIVINE AND ITs RELATION TO THE RATIONAL (2d ed. 1950).
895 See RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONS AND RELIGIONS vii (Leonard Swidler
ed., 1986). The Special Rapporteur on religious liberty, Elizabeth Odio-Benito, has written simi-
larly that religion is "an explanation of the meaning of life and how to live accordingly. Every
religion has at least a creed, a code of action, and a cult." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26, at
4.
396 See supra notes 18-20.
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licans most prominently and consistently. Their efforts, while often
independent and wide-ranging, collectively yielded several "first principles"
to guide the American experiment-liberty of conscience, free exercise,
equality, pluralism, separationism, and disestablishment, which were collec-
tively called "the essential rights and liberties of religion." These principles
were, in effect, "incorporated" into the First Amendment religion clauses as
well as in state constitutional bills of rights.
In the past half century, the United States Supreme Court has assumed
principal control of the American experiment. The Court's free exercise
and establishment clause cases have served both to enhance and to frus-
trate the experiment-in part, because these two lines of cases have not
been effectively merged, in part because the Court has often dealt inconsis-
tently with the "first principles" of the experiment. In its early free exercise
cases, the Court incorporated the full range of "first principles" into its
analysis-catalyzing great advances in the protection of religious rights and
liberties. In the past decade, however, the Court has abruptly reduced the
free exercise clause to a single principle of equality, or neutrality, render-
ing the free exercise clause largely inept in its protection of religious lib-
erty. The trend in establishment clause law has been exactly the opposite.
In its early establishment clause cases, the Court was almost single-minded
in its devotion to the principle of separationism-yielding secularist dicta
that seemed anomalous to a nation so widely devoted to a public religion
and a religious public. In the past decade, however, the Court has opened
its establishment clause calculus to a wide range of "first principles," which
the Court is struggling mightily to integrate.
Jurists and politicians have offered an array of methods and
frameworks to aid this effort of integration-in articles, briefs, bills, and
various other forms and forums. The Supreme Court has, as yet, not found
a viable media among these competing models or among its own plurality
opinions in recent First Amendment cases. Recent international human
rights instruments and practices might well open new pathways toward a
more unified approach. International law confirms, refines, and elabo-
rates many of the "essential rights and liberties of religion" endemic to the
American experiment. The prioritizing of liberty of conscience, free exer-
cise, and equality principles at international law might well serve as a proto-
type for the integration of free exercise and establishment clause values.
The growing emphasis at international law on group religious rights, and
the need for affirmative state action towards religion encourages greater
protection of religious minorities in America. The international doctrine
of "a margin of appreciation" for local religious practices could be put to
good use in our federalist system of government with its local jury trials.
The eventual resolution of the international debate between "universalism
versus relativism" in human rights has enormous implications for the dis-
tinctive American debate over federal and state jurisdiction over religious
rights.
The American experiment in religious rights and liberties has often
been the envy of the world. Yet brief glimpses by foreigners into the
Supreme Court laboratory, where much of the experiment has recently
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been conducted, have often produced both caricatures and characteristi-
cally optimistic assessments of this experiment. Not all is so simple, nor so
well, as it might appear from afar. However bold in conception and execu-
tion, the experiment has occasionally sputtered in the past, and it is sput-
tering today. In the past, it was through landmark cases-Cantwel Everson,
Sherbert, and Lemon-that the Court could set the experiment right. Today,
it might well be up to Congress or to individual states eventually to restore
a coherent American rule of law on religion. Whatever branch of govern-
ment assumes the responsibility, it would do well to look out the windows
of its laboratory on the rest of the world.

